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Abstract The report outlines the Polish constitutional culture and explores the
interaction with EU and international law before the 2015–2018 illiberal turn in the
country. The report recalls that the Communist Constitution had been political and
its observance was ﬁctional. After the transition in 1989 and in the new 1997
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Constitution, emphasis was on the direct application of constitutional provisions,
the rule of law principle, the democratic and social state, a broad catalogue of rights
and freedoms with the precise permissible grounds for their limitation, as well as
institutional guarantees and judicial procedures against violations of those rights
and freedoms. The Constitutional Tribunal carried out stringent review of legal
provisions. The main grounds for declaration of unconstitutionality were violation
of the rule of law, the right to a fair trial, the principle of proportionality and
exceeding powers delegated to the executive. The Constitutional Tribunal also
exercised review over EU and international treaties and measures implementing EU
law. Although the Constitutional Tribunal stated that the Constitution was the
supreme law of Poland, it respected the autonomy of EU law and the competences
of the ECJ, adopting the approach of a consistent interpretation of Polish law with
EU law. Some key examples of the case law include constitutional challenges
regarding the Accession Treaty, the Brussels I Regulation, the European Arrest
Warrant (EAW) and the ESM Treaty. The EAW judgment led to a constitutional
amendment allowing the surrender of Polish citizens under certain circumstances.
The conditions and grounds for limitation of rights are more restrictive than in EU
law.
Keywords The Constitution of Poland  Constitutional provisions regarding EU
and international co-operation  The Polish Constitutional Tribunal
Constitutional review  The rule of law, fundamental rights and their limitation
Constitutional safeguards and judicial review  The principles of proportionality,
legal certainty and legitimate expectations  Defence rights, presumption of inno-
cence  Constitutional review of EU law  Accession Treaty  European Arrest
Warrant  ESM Treaty  International extradition treaties  Referendum
1 Constitutional Amendments Regarding EU Membership
1.1 Constitutional Culture
1.1.1 The history of Polish constitutionalism dates back to the 16th century.1 The
crowning achievement was the Constitution of 3 May (Konstytucja 3 Maja),
adopted by the Parliament (Sejm Wielki) in 1791. It is considered to be the second
written constitution in the world and the ﬁrst in Europe. The Constitution, formally
enacted as Governmental Act (Ustawa Rządowa), introduced the principle of
sovereignty of the people, the separation of powers into legislative, executive and
judiciary and guaranteed a number of important individual liberties. It was influ-
enced by viÔews of the French philosophers J.J. Rousseau and C.L. Montesquieu.
The Constitution was an attempt to reform the political system after many years of
1 Uruszczak 2010, p. 222.
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political stagnation at the time of Poland’s dependence on powerful neighbours.
The Three Partitions of Poland (1772, 1793 and 1795), the territory of which was
seized by the Russian Empire, Prussia and the Austrian Empire, effectively ended
Polish national sovereignty until 1918. Although in effect for only a short time, the
Constitution of 3 May became a symbol of Poland’s national identity based on
constitutional values and allowed its principles to survive for the upcoming years of
foreign domination.2
Poland regained its independence after World War I in November 1918. During
the time of the Second Polish Republic until the outbreak of World War II in 1939,
three constitutions were adopted: the Little Constitution of 1919 (Mała Konstytucja
z 1919), the Constitution of 1921 (Konstytucja Marcowa) and the Constitution of
1935 (Konstytucja Kwietniowa).
After World War II, the Polish Parliament controlled by Communists adopted the
provisional Little Constitution in 1947 (Mała Konstytucja z 1947). On 22 July 1952
the Parliament enacted a Communist constitution, based on the Stalinist Soviet
Constitution of 1936, and the name of the state was changed to the People’s Republic
of Poland. The sovereign was described as the working people of towns and villages,
and the system was structured upon socialised ownership of the means of production
and central planning. The structure of state organs was based on the principle of the
uniformity of state authority. The political constitutional provisions were only a
facade hiding the real system of government, subordinate to the principle of lead-
ership of the Communist Party with limits on Polish sovereignty imposed by the
USSR,3 irrespective of the fact that the systemic role of the Communist Party was
only formally introduced into the Constitution in 1976. The rights and freedoms of
individuals were regulated in the ﬁnal part of the Constitution, giving clear priority
to social and economic rights. The Constitution of 1952 did not introduce institu-
tional guarantees or judicial procedures against violations of rights and liberties, and
therefore its observance was only ﬁctional.4 The nature of the Constitution was
predominantly political and its role as the legal act having superior position in the
system of national law was considerably reduced.5
A new chapter in the history of Polish constitutionalism started in 1989. Changes
in the Constitution reflected the political and economic transition towards a
democratic state and market economy. The amendment re-established the tradi-
tional name of the Polish state – the Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska),
restored the principle of the sovereignty of the Nation and introduced the principle
of a democratic state ruled by law.6
The current Constitution, which is one of the newest constitutions in Europe,
was adopted by the National Assembly on 2 April 1997 and approved by a national
2 Brzezinski 1991, pp. 60–70; see also Davies 2005, pp. 511 et seq.
3 Garlicki 2010b, p. 15.
4 Prokop 2011, pp. 24–25.
5 Garlicki 2010b, p. 16.
6 Prokop 2011, p. 27.
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referendum held on 25 May 1997.7 It entered into force on 17 September 1997. It
falls within the category of basic laws of the state that were created after the fall of a
Communist regime.8 Accordingly, the Preamble emphasises that in 1989, the
Homeland recovered the possibility of a sovereign and democratic determination of
its fate. Article 13 provides that political parties and other organisations with
programmes based upon totalitarian methods and the modes of activity of Nazism,
Fascism and Communism, shall be prohibited.9 The present Constitution remains
within the category of constitutions that have a legal character and are enforceable
in courts. The main approach to constitutional regulation relevant to the founders of
the Polish Constitution, as in other countries of Eastern and Central Europe, was an
emphasis on the legal nature of the norms contained in the basic law of the state.10
According to Art. 8(2), provisions of the Constitution shall apply directly, unless
the Constitution provides otherwise. Chapter II of the Constitution entitled ‘The
Freedoms, Rights and Obligations of Persons and Citizens’ contains a wide cata-
logue of rights and freedoms which may be invoked directly on the basis of con-
stitutional norms before the courts and administrative organs of the state.
1.1.2 Compared to other European constitutions, the Polish Constitution is quite
long. It is composed of a preamble and 13 chapters, including 243 articles. The
legal commentary explains this unique feature as a consequence of seeking the
widest possible democratic compromise during the creation of the basic law.11
The Polish Constitution contains provisions proclaiming the sovereignty of the
Nation and the organisation of the State, as well as provisions limiting the power of
public authorities by protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms, the rule of
law and the separation of powers with due checks and balances. Chapter I entitled
‘The Republic’ contains provisions regarding the principle of a democratic state
ruled by law (Art. 2), the principle of sovereignty of the Nation (Art. 4), the
independence and territorial integrity of the state (Art. 5), the principle of legality
(Art. 7), the principle of separation and balance between the legislative, executive
and judicial powers (Art. 10), political pluralism (Art. 11) and the decentralisation
of public power (Art. 15).
Having in mind the negative experience regarding the Constitution of 1952, the
founders of the current Constitution gave priority to the provisions concerning
human and citizens’ rights and freedoms as well as the ways to protect them,
placing them before the provisions on the functioning of the state and its organs.12
7 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Journal of Laws 1997, No. 78, item
483.
8 Albi 2005, pp. 19–21.
9 All translations of constitutional provisions are from the unofﬁcial translation of the Polish
Constitution provided by the Parliament available at http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/
angielski/kon1.htm.
10 Grzybowski 2002, p. 12.
11 Rakowska and Skotnicki 2007, p. 219.
12 Sokolewicz 2001, pp. 19–20.
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On the one hand, such solution proves that the state authorities have a subsidiary
role in relation to the individual, and on the other hand it creates the highest
guarantee and respect for individual rights and freedoms. Chapter II contains
provisions devoted to general principles (Arts. 30–37), personal freedoms and
rights (Arts. 38–56), political freedoms and rights (Arts. 57–63), economic, social
and cultural freedoms and rights (Arts. 64–76), means for the defence of freedoms
and rights (Arts. 77–81) and obligations (Arts. 82–86). Provisions concerning
rights and freedoms of the individual are also found in the Preamble, and in
Chapters I, IV and XI. It must be concluded that such provisions account for more
than 25% of the Constitution.13
Further chapters of the Constitution concern sources of law (Chapter III), the
Parliament (Sejm) and the Senate (Chapter IV), the President of the Republic
(Chapter V), the Council of Ministers and government administration (Chapter VI),
local government (Chapter VII), courts and tribunals (Chapter VIII), organs of state
control and for defence of rights (Chapter IX), public ﬁnances (Chapter X),
extraordinary measures (Chapter XI) and amendment of the Constitution (Chapter
XII).
1.2 The Amendment of the Constitution in Relation
to the European Union
1.2.1 The Agreement establishing an association between the European
Communities, its Member States and Poland (Europe Agreement) was signed in
December 1991. Among various issues discussed in the course of preparatory work
on the new Constitution was the so-called ‘integration clause’ or ‘European clause’
concerning the transfer of competences to international organisations and forming a
legal basis for future accession to the European Union. The integration clause was
included as Art. 90(1) in the Constitution of 1997. Article 90 is contained in
Chapter III of the Constitution entitled ‘Sources of Law’. The discussion on the
drafting of the provision concerned phrases such as ‘supranational organisation’,
‘transfer of the exercise of the competences’ and ‘public organs’.14 Finally the
expressions ‘international organization or international organ’, ‘transfer of com-
petences’ and ‘organs of State authority’ were used. It must be emphasised that the
Polish word ‘przekazanie’, used in Art. 90(1) of the Constitution may be translated
alternatively as ‘transfer’, ‘delegation’ or ‘conferral’ of competences.15
13 Jabłoński 2010, p. 80.
14 Biernat 2007, p. 247; Wojtyczek 2007, p. 17; Działocha 1996, pp. 6–11.
15 The unofﬁcial translation of the Polish Constitution uses the word ‘delegation’. The word
‘conferral’ is used by the Constitutional Tribunal Publication Ofﬁce in Selected rulings of the
Polish Constitutional Tribunal concerning the law of the European Union (2003–2014), vol. LI,
Warsaw 2014. http://trybunal.gov.pl/publikacje/wydawnictwa/art/7070-tom-li-selected-rulings-of-
the-polish-constitutional-tribunal-concerning-the-law-of-the-european-un/. The authors of the
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According to Art. 90(1) of the Constitution, ‘[t]he Republic of Poland may, by
virtue of international agreements, transfer to an international organization or
international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to
certain matters’. The procedure concerning ratiﬁcation of such an agreement is
speciﬁed in Arts. 90(2)–(4) of the Constitution. A statute granting consent for
ratiﬁcation of the agreement may be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the
Sejm (lower chamber of the Polish Parliament) and the Senate or approved in a
nationwide referendum. The resolution in respect of the choice of procedure for
granting consent to ratiﬁcation (by Parliament or national referendum) shall be
taken by the Sejm by an absolute majority vote taken in the presence of at least
one-half of the statutory number of Deputies. Accordingly, the ratiﬁcation of
international agreements concerning transfer of competences requires greater
democratic legitimacy granted by the Parliament, or by the Nation, than other
international agreements speciﬁed in Art. 89 of the Constitution (see Sect. 3.1.1).
To date, the procedure speciﬁed in Art. 90 of the Constitution has been used twice,
in both instances in relation to the European Union. Consent for ratiﬁcation of the
Accession Treaty signed in Athens on 16 April 2003 was given in a national
referendum held on 7 and 8 June 2003 by 77.45% of voters. In accordance with the
result of the referendum, the President ratiﬁed the Accession Treaty on 23 July
2003. Consent for ratiﬁcation of the Lisbon Treaty was given by the Sejm and the
Senate with a two-thirds majority vote and ratiﬁed by the President on 10 October
2008.
During preparatory work for the new Constitution, the provisions concerning the
position of primary and secondary EU law within the system of sources of law
applicable in the territory of Poland were also discussed. The drafters of the
Constitution decided that the main sources of primary law – the EU Treaties – shall
not be distinguished from other ratiﬁed international agreements in the Polish legal
system (Arts. 91(1) and (2) of the Constitution). After promulgation, an interna-
tional agreement constitutes part of the domestic legal order and applies directly,
unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute. If such an agreement is
ratiﬁed upon prior consent granted by a statute, in the case of a conflict of norms,
the agreement has precedence over statutes (see Sect. 3.2.1). As for secondary EU
law, Art. 91(3) of the Constitution states that ‘[i]f an agreement, ratiﬁed by the
Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the laws
established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a
conflict of laws’. In the course of parliamentary drafting work, Deputies and
Senators opted not to establish the precedence of EU secondary law over ‘norms of
national law’ (including the Constitution), in favour of ‘statutes’.16
Since its adoption, the Constitution of 1997 has been amended only twice. The
amendment of 8 September 2006 was directly related to membership in the
present contribution share the view that the word ‘transfer’ corresponds best to the meaning of the
word ‘przekazanie’.
16 Wojtyczek 2007, p. 25.
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European Union and concerned the prohibition of the extradition of Polish citizens
provided in Art. 55(1) of the Constitution.17 The Constitution was amended in
order to give effect to Council Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European
Arrest Warrant18 (see Sect. 1.2.3).
1.2.2 Poland’s Constitution is considered to be a ‘rigid constitution’ because the
process of amendment prescribed in its Art. 235 is detailed and requires political
consent. A bill to amend the Constitution may be submitted by at least one-ﬁfth of
the statutory number of Deputies, the Senate or the President. A bill to amend the
Constitution shall be adopted by the Sejm by a majority of at least two-thirds of
votes in the presence of at least one-half of the statutory number of Deputies, and by
the Senate by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least one-half of the
statutory number of Senators. If a bill to amend the Constitution relates to the
provisions contained in Chapters I, II or XII, all subjects authorised to submit the
bill may require, within 45 days of the adoption of the bill by the Senate, that a
conﬁrmatory referendum be held. Such amendment of the Constitution shall be
deemed to be approved if the majority of persons voting in the referendum express
support for the amendment. The President shall sign the statute within 21 days of its
submission and order its promulgation in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of
Poland.
The amendment concerning Art. 55(1) of the Constitution related to Chapter II
of the Constitution. It was adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Deputies and by
an absolute majority of the Senators. A conﬁrmatory referendum was not required.
1.2.3 The direct reason for the amendment of Art. 55(1) of the Constitution was the
judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal relating to the European Arrest Warrant
(EAW).19 The aforementioned provision originally stated that ‘[t]he extradition of a
Polish citizen shall be forbidden’. The Constitutional Tribunal decided that Art.
607t§1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to the extent that it permitted surrender
of a Polish national to a Member State of the European Union, was inconsistent
with Art. 55(1) of the Constitution. The Tribunal analysed whether there was any
difference between ‘extradition’ (ekstradycja), within the meaning of Art. 55(1) of
the Constitution, and ‘surrender’ (wydanie, przekazanie) used in the EAW
Framework Decision. Different views were presented in the legal literature.20 The
Tribunal stated that the essence (core) of extradition lies in the transfer of a pros-
ecuted or sentenced person for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution or
17 Statute amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 8 September 2006, Journal of
Laws 2006 No. 200, item. 1471.
18 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA), [2002] OJ L 190/1.
19 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 27 April 2005, ref. No. P 1/05.
20 Płachta 2002, pp. 71–72; Kruszyński 2004, pp. 9–10.
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executing a penalty imposed against them. The surrender of a prosecuted person on
the basis of an EAW is in essence the same. Accordingly, it should be viewed as a
particular form of extradition. The Tribunal pointed out that considering Poland’s
obligations as implied by EU membership, it is essential that the applicable law be
changed such as to enable full implementation of Framework Decision 2002/584.
The bill to amend Art. 55 of the Constitution was submitted to Parliament by the
President on 15 May 2006. The Deputies, in line with the aforementioned judgment
of the Constitutional Tribunal, decided that the surrender of persons on the basis of
an EAW must be viewed as a form of extradition in the meaning of Art. 55(1) of
the Constitution.21 According to the new Art. 55 of the Constitution:
1. The extradition of a Polish citizen shall be prohibited, except in cases speciﬁed in paras.
2 and 3.
2. Extradition of a Polish citizen may be granted upon a request made by a foreign state or
an international judicial body if such a possibility stems from an international treaty
ratiﬁed by Poland or a statute implementing a legal instrument enacted by an interna-
tional organisation of which the Republic of Poland is a member, provided that the act
covered by a request for extradition:
(1) was committed outside the territory of the Republic of Poland, and
(2) constituted an offence under the law in force in the Republic of Poland or would have
constituted an offence under the law in force in the Republic of Poland if it had been
committed within the territory of the Republic of Poland, both at the time of its
commitment and at the time of the making of the request.
3. Compliance with the conditions speciﬁed in para. 2 subparas 1 and 2 shall not be
required if an extradition request is made by an international judicial body established
under an international treaty ratiﬁed by Poland, in connection with a crime of genocide,
crime against humanity, war crime or a crime of aggression, covered by the jurisdiction
of that body.
4. The extradition of a person suspected of the commission of a crime for political reasons
but without the use of force shall be forbidden, so as an extradition which would violate
rights and freedoms of persons and citizens.
5. The courts shall adjudicate on the admissibility of extradition.
1.2.4 The current provisions including Arts. 90 and 91 of the Constitution are
considered by some observers to be insufﬁcient, considering further developments
in the European legal order, especially those introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.
Different proposals concerning the amendment of the Constitution relating to
Poland’s membership in the EU were formulated in the legal literature and were
submitted to Parliament.22 The most important proposals were presented by
21 Extraordinary Commission for consideration of the draft legislation presented by the President
of the Republic of Poland concerning the amendment of the Constitution and Code of Criminal
Procedure, Bulletin No. 972/V of 21 August 2006.
22 Laskowska 2011, pp. 201 et seq.
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President Bronisław Komorowski (on 16 November 2010, No. 3598) and by the
Deputies (on 26 November 2010, No. 3687) and concerned the introduction of a
new chapter Xa relating to Poland’s membership in the EU in the Constitution.23
The proposals were jointly considered by the Constitutional Committee and
underwent two readings in the Sejm. They did not come into force due to a lack of
political will on the part of the Deputies followed by the end of the VII term of
ofﬁce of the Sejm in November 2011.
The changes to the Polish Constitution related to membership in the European
Union can be divided into the necessary and the desirable (see Sects. 1.5.2 and
2.13.4). In view of the future adoption of the euro, Art. 227 of the Constitution must
be amended to guarantee the independence of the National Bank of Poland and
ensure the competence of the European Central Bank associated with the issue of
the common currency. Such amendment is necessary for compliance with Art.
131 TFEU.
1.3 Conceptualising Sovereignty and the Limits
to the Transfer of Powers
1.3.1 The rules regarding the transfer of competences of the organs of state
authority to the European Union are speciﬁed in Art. 90 of the Constitution (see
Sect. 1.2.1). The primacy of secondary EU law over statutes and the direct appli-
cability of such law is governed by Art. 91(3) of the Constitution (see Sect. 1.2.1).
1.3.2 The most comprehensive interpretation of Art. 90(1) of the Constitution was
presented by the Constitutional Tribunal in the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM) case,24 where the Court stated that the essence of Art. 90 is to provide a
guarantee for the sovereignty of the Nation and the state by providing formal
restrictions to the transfer of competences vested in the organs of state authority.
The transfer of competences is admissible under the following conditions: (1) the
transfer is to an international organisation or organ; (2) the competences relate to
certain matters and (3) consent is granted by the Parliament or alternatively by the
sovereign acting by way of a nationwide referendum. This triad of constitutional
restrictions must be preserved in order to maintain the conformity of the conferral
with the Constitution. Taking into consideration its previous jurisprudence as well
as views presented in legal commentaries, the Tribunal stated that Art. 90 shall be
applied in the following situations: (1) the subject of the international agreement
concerns competences on the basis of which the organs of state authority issue legal
acts (in particular legislative acts); (2) the competence is conferred on an
23 Chruściak 2013, pp. 59 et seq.
24 Judgment of 26 June 2013, ref. No. K 33/12.
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international (supranational) institution or organisation; (3) the effect of the con-
ferral is that the organisation can exercise the competence to issue legal acts (in
particular legislative acts) that are binding on individuals and state organs.
The Constitutional Tribunal has also developed the concept of ‘activation of
competences’ as opposed to ‘transfer of competences’ in its jurisprudence. In the
judgment concerning a declaration speciﬁed in the former Art. 35(2) TEU on
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Third
Pillar and in order to allow the submission of requests for a preliminary ruling by
the Polish courts in the Third Pillar,25 the Tribunal underlined that such competence
was acquired by Poland by the Treaty of Accession, and that the declaration ‘means
only activation of that competence, and not its emergence’.
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal acknowledged the view presented in the legal
literature that absolute sovereignty has been replaced by a modern and revised
approach. In its judgment on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon,26 the
Tribunal emphasised that ‘in the doctrine of international law, there is the view that
the concept of absolute, unrestrained sovereignty is a thing of the past’. The
Constitutional Tribunal stated that a distinction is drawn between, on the one hand,
the limitation of sovereignty arising from the will of the state that is in accordance
with international law and, on the other hand, the infringements of sovereignty
which occur against the will of the state and which are inconsistent with interna-
tional law. By incurring obligations, the state does not necessarily limit its freedom
of activity, but at times extends its activity into ﬁelds where it has not acted before.
The ability to incur international obligations is what international law implies in the
legal character of the state, and what constitutes the identity of the state in inter-
national law. Therefore, this is not a factor that limits sovereignty, but it is rather a
manifestation of sovereignty. The Constitutional Tribunal shared the view
expressed in legal commentary that accession to the European Union is perceived as
a sort of limitation of the sovereignty of a given state, but it does not mean the loss
of sovereignty and is tied to a compensatory effect in the form of the possibility to
partake in the decision-making processes of the European Union.
1.3.3 In its judgment on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Accession,27 the
Tribunal determined the limits to the transfer of powers by stating that the conferral
of competences ‘in relation to certain matters’ must be construed as a prohibition
against conferring all competences vested in a given organ of state authority, and
conferring all competences within a given scope, as well as a prohibition against
conferring competences concerning matters that fall within the scope of powers of a
given organ of state authority. Therefore, it is necessary to precisely specify the
areas and the scope of competences that are subject to conferral. At the same time,
25 Judgment of 18 February 2009, ref. No. Kp 3/08.
26 Judgment of 24 November 2010, ref. No. K 32/09.
27 Judgment of 11 May 2005, ref. No. K 18/04.
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Art. 90(1) of the Constitution may not constitute a basis for granting an interna-
tional organisation (or an organ thereof) the competence to enact legal acts or make
decisions that would be inconsistent with the Constitution, in particular to the extent
that Poland could not function as a sovereign and democratic state (‘core’ powers).
Further, in the judgment concerning the Lisbon Treaty, the Tribunal shared the view
expressed in the legal commentaries that the concept of constitutional identity
determines the scope of matters excluded from the competence to confer compe-
tences. The matters for which conferral is prohibited are the fundamental principles
of the Constitution: the principle of independent statehood, democratic governance,
rule of law, social justice, human dignity and protection of the rights and freedoms
of the individual.
1.3.4 According to Art. 8(1) of the Constitution, ‘[t]he Constitution shall be the
supreme law of the Republic of Poland’. This principle is also upheld by Art. 91 of
the Constitution that determines the position of primary and secondary EU law
within the system of sources of law applicable in the territory of Poland (see
Sect. 3.2.1). The most comprehensive interpretation of the supreme role of the
Constitution over European Union law was presented in the judgment concerning
the Treaty of Accession. The Constitutional Tribunal stated that given its supreme
legal force, the Constitution enjoys primacy within the territory of the Republic of
Poland. If an irreconcilable inconsistency were to appear between a constitutional
norm and an EU norm, such a collision could in no event be resolved by assuming
the supremacy of the EU norm over the constitutional norm. Furthermore, such
collision could not lead to a situation where a constitutional norm loses its binding
force and is substituted by an EU norm, nor could it lead to the application of the
constitutional norm restricted to areas beyond the scope of EU law. This view was
upheld by the Constitutional Tribunal in its judgments concerning the Lisbon
Treaty and the Brussels I Regulation.
The principle of interpreting domestic law in a ‘Europe-friendly’ manner is
clearly phrased in the case law of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. However,
there are limits to such interpretation and they result from the supreme power of the
Constitution. In particular, the norms of the Constitution within the ﬁeld of indi-
vidual rights and freedoms indicate a minimum threshold which may not be low-
ered or questioned as a result of EU provisions. Undoubtedly, a ruling declaring the
non-conformity of EU law with the Constitution should be an ultima ratio and
ought to be delivered only when all other ways of resolving a conflict between
Polish norms and the norms of the EU legal order have failed. In the event a
‘Europe-friendly’ interpretation is not possible, the Nation as the sovereign or an
organ of state authority authorised by the Constitution to represent the Nation
would need to decide to either amend the Constitution, seek modiﬁcations to the EU
provisions or, ultimately, initiate Poland’s withdrawal from the European Union.
The Brussels I judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was the ﬁrst case
in which the constitutional court of an EU Member State directly reviewed the
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constitutionality of secondary EU law and issued a ruling on the merits.28 The
Constitutional Tribunal adjudicated that Art. 41, second sentence, of the Brussels I
Regulation (Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial mat-
ters)29 was consistent with the right to a fair hearing and the equal rights of parties
to court proceedings (Art. 45(1) in conjunction with Art. 32(2) of the Constitution).
The admissibility of such control was closely related to the type of constitutional
proceedings commenced by way of a constitutional complaint submitted by an
individual (substantial review of norms).30 According to Art. 79(1) of the
Constitution, an individual may in a constitutional complaint challenge the con-
formity of a statute or other normative act (forming a basis for the court’s judgment
in his or her case) with the Constitution. According to the Constitutional Tribunal,
‘normative act’, within the meaning of Art. 79(1) of the Constitution, includes not
only normative acts issued by one of the organs of the Polish state, but also – after
fulﬁlling further requirements – legal acts issued by an organ of an international
organisation. In view of the Tribunal, the regulation speciﬁed in Art. 288 TFEU
may be regarded as a normative act within the meaning of Art. 79(1) of the
Constitution. Allowing for the possibility of examining the conformity of EU
secondary legislation with the Constitution, the Tribunal emphasised the need to
maintain due caution and restraint in that regard, because of the principle of sincere
cooperation referred to in Art. 4(3) TEU (see Sect. 2.8.4). The judgment in case ref.
No. SK 45/09 opened a wide debate as to the limits of control of EU secondary law
by the Constitutional Tribunal.31 In the opinion of one group of authors, the
Tribunal has no competence to control EU secondary law and should discontinue
any such pending proceedings. The courts of the European Union have exclusive
jurisdiction in that respect. By contrast, the authors belonging to another group
share the view that the limits of control are determined by constitutional norms, as
well as EU law. The Tribunal has competence to control EU secondary legislation
(normative acts) only where the Constitution explicitly refers to the review of
normative acts (i.e. within the framework of a constitutional complaint or questions
of law referred by national courts). By virtue of the limitations imposed on the
constitutional complaint procedure, the Tribunal would not be able to examine
whether a given act was ultra vires, i.e. whether it was within the scope of com-
petence conferred by Poland on the EU. If, however, an ultra vires action resulted
in an infringement of Polish constitutional rights and freedoms, the complaint
would have to be considered admissible. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to declare
28 Judgment of 16 November 2011, ref. no SK 45/09.
29 [2001] OJ L 12/1.
30 In its Order of 17 December 2009, ref. No. U 6/08, the Tribunal expressed the view that the
constitutional review of norms of EU secondary legislation was inadmissible. The proceedings in
that case were instituted by an application submitted by a group of Sejm Deputies and they
concerned an abstract review of norms.
31 Safjan 2012, pp. 339–367; Bogdanowicz and Marcisz 2012, pp. 47–53; Tatham 2013, pp. 252–
259; Kawczyńska 2014, pp. 233–243; Dudzik and Półtorak 2012, pp. 245–255.
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that the acts of EU institutions are invalid. However, as other national courts, the
Tribunal may consider the validity of an EU act.32 In case of doubt, it should
ascertain the content of the norms of EU secondary legislation which are subject to
review. This may be achieved by referring questions to the ECJ for a preliminary
ruling, pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU, as to the interpretation or validity of provisions
that raise doubts. It is also worth mentioning that one of the proposals concerning
amendment of the Constitution submitted by a group of Sejm Deputies in
November 2009 postulated the competence of the Constitutional Tribunal to
adjudicate the conformity of secondary EU law with the Constitution (new
Art. 188(1a)). Legal experts unanimously held that such amendment would be
incompatible with EU law (see Sect. 1.2.4).
1.4 Democratic Control
1.4.1 The participation of the national parliament in EU decision-making processes
is regulated in the statute of 8 October 2010 on cooperation of the Council of
Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate in matters related to the membership of the
Republic of Poland in the European Union (hereinafter Cooperation Act).33 It takes
into account the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon that strengthened democratic
legitimacy within the EU. Cooperation between the executive and legislative
powers covers ﬁve main areas: adoption of EU law and revision of the Treaties,
adoption of national acts implementing EU law, lodging of complaints with the ECJ
concerning breaches of the principle of subsidiarity by an EU legislative act,
expressing opinions on candidates for certain posts in the EU and the participation
of the representatives of the Polish Council of Ministers in the Council. According
to the Cooperation Act, the Council of Ministers is obliged to provide the
Parliament with information on Poland’s participation in EU activities, transmit the
documents of the EU which are subject to consultation with Member States,
transmit Poland’s draft positions on draft EU legislative acts, lodge complaints
upon Parliamentary request to the ECJ concerning breaches of the principle of
subsidiarity and present candidatures for certain posts in the EU.
The detailed rules concerning the participation of the Polish Parliament in EU
decision-making are speciﬁed in the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm (Chapter XIIIa)
and the Rules of Procedure of the Senate (Chapter VIIIa). There is a European
Union Affairs Committee in each of the chambers that expresses the opinions of its
members concerning drafts of EU legal acts and Poland’s positions taken in the
course of EU law-making procedures. Opinions expressed by the Committee should
provide a basis for Poland’s position. If a position taken or presented by the Polish
32 Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR I-04199.
33 Journal of Laws 2010, No. 213, item 1395.
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Council of Ministers in the Council or in the European Council does not take such
opinions into consideration, the minister is required to explain the reasons why.
1.4.2 The Constitution provides for three types of nationwide referendum: (1) de-
ciding on matters of particular importance to the state (Art. 125); (2) granting
consent for ratiﬁcation of an international agreement transferring the competences of
organs of state authority to an international organisation or international organ (Art.
90(3)); and (3) amending Chapters I, II or XII of the Constitution (Art. 235(6)). In
the ﬁrst two cases the result of a nationwide referendum shall be binding if more than
one-half of entitled voters have participated in the vote. The requirement regarding
turnout is very demanding and may cause problems in ﬁelds where citizens are not
very active.34 During the parliamentary proceedings to adopt Art. 90(3) of the
Constitution, the Constitutional Committee abandoned the idea of an obligatory
referendum in cases concerning transfer of competences to an international organ-
isation because it might have required the organisation of a referendum on a number
of occasions.35 In Poland there has only been one referendum related to EU matters,
held on 7 and 8 June 2003, in which 58.85% of eligible voters participated. The
Nation expressed its consent for the ratiﬁcation of the Treaty of Accession by a
77.45% majority. A referendum concerning the adoption of the EU Constitutional
Treaty was planned for October 2005, but this was abandoned due to the negative
referendum results in France and the Netherlands.
1.5 The Reasons for, and the Role of, EU Amendments
1.5.1–1.5.2 The EU amendment to the Polish Constitution of 1997 is limited in its
scope (see Sect. 1.2.3). The reason behind such disposition is the dispute about the
necessity and scope of such amendments and the difﬁculty of the amendment
procedure (see Sect. 1.2.2), especially in the Sejm where at least two-thirds of votes
in the presence of at least one-half of the statutory number of Deputies is required. It
is very difﬁcult to obtain a political consensus between the governing coalition and
the opposition (which mainly consists of Eurosceptics). The experts share the view
that the Constitution in its present state allows Poland to fulﬁl its obligations arising
from membership in the European Union.36 However, in view of the future
accession of Poland to the eurozone, the Constitution requires amendments
34 In Judgment of 27 May 2003, ref. No. K 11/03, the Constitutional Tribunal stated that if the
ratiﬁcation referendum speciﬁed in Art. 90(3) of the Constitution did not deliver a legally binding
result for reasons of an insufﬁcient turnout (i.e. fewer than 50% of citizens with the right to vote
participated), the Sejm could adopt a resolution governing the choice of procedure for granting
consent for ratiﬁcation again and, therefore, could choose whether to hold another referendum or
to initiate the parliamentary procedure.
35 Chruściak 2003, pp. 52–53.
36 Biernat 2004, pp. 63–85.
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concerning the position of the National Bank of Poland and the Council for
Monetary Policy (see Sect. 1.2.4). At present there is no political consensus for such
an amendment.
1.5.3 The role of national constitutions in a context where power is increasingly
exercised at supranational and global level is still fundamental. The authors of the
present contribution share the view expressed by the Constitutional Tribunal in the
Lisbon Treaty case that ‘the EU Member States retain their sovereignty due to the
fact that their constitutions, being manifestation of the state’s sovereignty, maintain
their signiﬁcance’. The need for amendments depends on the wording of the given
constitution, the constitutional traditions of the particular state and its political
situation. The Polish Constitution is characterised by openness towards the
European Union.37
2 Constitutional Rights, the Rule of Law and EU Law
2.1 The Position of Constitutional Rights and the Rule
of Law in the Constitution
2.1.1 Chapter I of the Constitution entitled ‘The Republic’ (Rzeczpospolita)
expounds the systemic principles that serve as the foundation of the Polish con-
stitutional system (see Sect. 1.1.2). One of the most important principles is con-
tained in Art. 2 of the Constitution, which states that ‘[t]he Republic of Poland shall
be a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice’
(see Sect. 2.1.3). The Constitutional Tribunal has derived a number of general
principles of law such as legal certainty, protection of acquired rights, protection of
legitimate expectations, proportionality, non-retroactivity of law and sufﬁcient va-
catio legis from this clause.38 The Constitution also enshrines other general prin-
ciples of law, such as subsidiarity (Preamble), legality (Art. 7), proportionality in
limitation of rights and freedoms (Art. 31 (3)), nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena
sine lege and the non-retroactivity of criminal law (Art. 42(1)).
Personal, political, economic, social and cultural freedoms and rights are con-
tained within the comprehensive Chapter II entitled ‘The Freedoms, Rights and
Obligations of Persons and Citizens’. The most fundamental principle is contained
in Art. 30 of the Constitution, which states that ‘[t]he inherent and inalienable
dignity of the person shall constitute a source of freedoms and rights of persons and
citizens. It shall be inviolable. The respect and protection thereof shall be the
obligation of public authorities’. In drafting these provisions the founders of the
Constitution were inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
37 Biernat 2002b, pp. 439–45.
38 See for example Judgment of 12 April 2000, ref. No. K 8/98.
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 and the European
Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (ECHR) as well as the constitutions of other
states.39
Rights and freedoms are enforceable in courts, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise. According to Art. 77(2) of the Constitution, statutes shall not bar
recourse by any person to the courts in pursuit of claims alleging infringement of
freedoms or rights. Institutional guarantees for the protection of rights and freedoms
are speciﬁed in Chapter II of the Constitution. These include the right to a fair trial
(Art. 45(1)), the right to compensation for any harm done by any action of an organ
of public authority contrary to law (Art. 77(1)), the right to appeal against judg-
ments and decisions made at ﬁrst instance (Art. 78), the guarantee of at least
two-stage court proceedings (Art. 176), the right to submit a constitutional com-
plaint to the Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 79) and the right to apply to the
Commissioner of Human Rights (Ombudsman) (Art. 80). Speciﬁc limitations are
provided for in Art. 81 of the Constitution enumerating economic and social rights
and freedoms that are enforceable only within the limits speciﬁed in a statute
(minimum level of remuneration for work, full and productive employment, aid to
disabled persons, consumer protection, ecological security and environmental
protection).
2.1.2 Article 31(3) of the Constitution provides the conditions under which limi-
tations can be imposed upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights.
Commentators point out that the general limitation clause provided in the Polish
Constitution is stricter than the limitation clause provided in Art. 52(1) of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter). Limitations to constitutional rights
and freedoms must meet the following cumulative conditions: may be speciﬁed
only by statute, must be necessary and must have one of only six particular aims
enumerated in Art. 31(3) of the Constitution:40
Article 31(3).
Any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed
only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its
security or public order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or
the freedoms and rights of other persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of
freedoms and rights.
However, this does not mean an absolute prohibition on placing restrictions on
constitutional rights and freedoms by governmental regulation, but a statute (Act of
Parliament) in this respect must play a decisive role.41 The jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Tribunal holds that particular rights and freedoms (of social and
39 Masternak-Kubiak 2010, p. 32. The provision contained in Art. 30 of the Constitution was also
inspired by the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949; see Zajadło 1998, p. 53.
40 Wróbel 2013, p. 1348.
41 Bosek and Szydło 2016, p. 780.
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economic character) may be limited by governmental regulation (i.e. executive
acts), issued on the basis of a speciﬁc authorisation contained in a statute (Art. 92(1)
of the Constitution).42
Nevertheless, with regard to personal rights and freedoms, penal law and tax
law, limitations may be imposed only by a statute adopted by the Parliament.43
Limitations to rights and freedoms in the Polish legal system may also stem from
international agreements ratiﬁed upon prior consent granted by statute, or from EU
regulations or EU decisions (that are applied directly in the national legal system).44
According to Art. 91(2) and (3) of the Constitution, these acts shall have precedence
over statutes.
The test of proportionality contained in the above Art. 31(3) is construed as the
sum of three component principles: the principle of usefulness, the principle of
necessity and a prohibition against excessive interference.
Notwithstanding the abovementioned clause, the Constitution contains provi-
sions that exclude any restrictions to rights and freedoms (Art. 40) or allow
restrictions to certain rights and freedoms only when introducing extraordinary
measures (Art. 228).
The conditions that deﬁne the public interest that are enumerated in Art. 31(3) of
the Constitution resemble those set out in the European Convention on Human
Rights (compare Arts. 8–11) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (compare Arts. 12(3), 18(3), 19(3), 21(3) and 22(2)). It should be noted that
the ofﬁcial Polish translations of the limitation clauses in the European Convention
on Human Rights are somewhat ambiguous. They do not refer to ‘law’ as in the
English or French versions (‘prescribed by law’ and ‘prévue par la loi'), rather they
refer to statute (‘przewidziane przez ustawę’ i.e. ‘prescribed by statute’). This does
not mean that the Convention excludes acts issued by executive authorities, but
additional requirements may arise from the different national legal systems. If the
system is based – as in Poland – on the principle of exclusivity of statutes to
regulate the legal situation of individuals, the limitations contained in executive
regulations (issued without statutory authorisation) may be regarded as contrary to
national law.45
The conditions speciﬁed in the general limitation clause in the Polish
Constitution are interpreted strictly. This means that if a limitation imposed on
rights or freedoms is not justiﬁed by any of the six aims enumerated in Art. 31(3) of
the Constitution, the limitation is prohibited, unless the speciﬁc provision of the
Constitution provides otherwise.46
42 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 July 2006, ref. no. P 24/05.
43 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 6 March 2002, ref. no. P 7/00.
44 Bosek and Szydło (2016), pp. 782–783.
45 Garlicki 2010a, p. 486.
46 Garlicki 2003, p. 22.
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The Polish Constitution contains other (speciﬁc) limitation clauses in addition to
Art. 31(3) of the Constitution. Some are wider than the general limitation clause.
For example, freedom of economic activity may be limited only for ‘important
public reasons’ (Art. 22). Some of the limitation clauses are narrower than the
general limitation clause. For example, the freedom to publicly express religion
may be limited only where this is necessary for the ‘defence of State security, public
order, health, morals or the freedoms and rights of others’ (Art. 53). As another
example, limitations on the right to obtain public information and access to public
documents may be imposed solely to ‘protect freedoms and rights of other persons
and economic subjects, public order, security or important economic interests of the
State’.
2.1.3 According to Art. 2 of the Constitution, the Republic of Poland shall be a
democratic state ruled by law. This provision enacts a constitutional principle
equivalent to the rule of law or Rechtsstaat. It was introduced in December 1989 as
an amendment to the Constitution of 1952. The Constitutional Tribunal has derived
a number of principles of law from this clause, which also remained valid under the
Constitution of 199747 (see Sect. 2.1.1). Article 2 of the Constitution and speciﬁc
principles derived from the rule of law are frequently used by the Constitutional
Tribunal, common and administrative courts in exercising judicial review. The
constitutional provision in question is treated as lex generalis. In most cases the
courts invoke more speciﬁc provisions aimed at the protection of rights and free-
doms. According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal, Art. 2 of the
Constitution may not form the sole legal foundation for a constitutional complaint
submitted by an individual contesting the validity of a legal norm, if the
Constitution provides for more speciﬁc provisions guaranteeing the protection of
rights and freedoms.
The Constitution of 1952 did not contain guarantees for the protection of rights
and freedoms such as the right to a fair trial. After the amendment of 1989, the
Constitutional Tribunal inferred the right to access to a court from the principle
of the rule of law.48 The Constitution of 1997 contains a special provision in
Art. 45(1) which stipulates that ‘everyone shall have the right to a fair and public
hearing of his case, without undue delay, before a competent, impartial and inde-
pendent court’. The Constitutional Tribunal has indicated in its jurisprudence that
the right to a fair trial enshrined in this provision comprises the following: (1) the
right of access to a court (the right to institute proceedings before a court – an
impartial and independent organ of the state); (2) the right to proper court pro-
ceedings which comply with the requirements of a fair and public hearing; (3) the
right to a court ruling (the right to have a given case determined in a legally
effective way by a court); and (4) the right to have cases examined by a court with
an adequate organisational structure and position. In recent case law, the
47 Garlicki 2010b, p. 61.
48 Judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal ref. No. K. 3/91, ref. No. K. 8/91, ref. No. K. 4/94,
ref. No. K. 11/95 and ref. No. K 14/96.
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Constitutional Tribunal has also emphasised the right to the effective enforcement
of a ﬁnal court ruling.
2.2 The Balancing of Fundamental Rights and Economic
Freedoms in EU Law
2.2.1 To date, no cases of direct conflict between EU economic freedoms and
fundamental rights have been brought before the Constitutional Tribunal. Such
issues arise more frequently before common and administrative courts. A recent
case concerned a conflict between the free movement of goods and protection of the
life and health of individuals. The case related to the prohibition on registering
passenger vehicles having their steering equipment on the right-hand side. In a
series of judgments the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decisions of the
Minister of Transportation refusing registration of such vehicles taking into con-
sideration the protection of road safety and protection of the health and lives of
people.49 The ECJ found that such restriction constituted a measure having
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Art.
34 TFEU.50 In the opinion of the Polish Council of Ministers, the ban imposed on
the registration of vehicles was justiﬁed by an imperative requirement in the public
interest for the purpose of protecting the lives and health of road users. The ECJ
accepted this reasoning but stated that the measure at issue was not compatible with
the principle of proportionality. In the view of the Court, according to the present
state of technology, measures exist that are less restrictive of the free movement of
goods and which are capable of signiﬁcantly reducing the risk which could be
created by the use of vehicles with the steering wheel placed on the same side as the
direction of trafﬁc.
2.3 Constitutional Rights, the European Arrest Warrant
and EU Criminal Law
2.3.1 The Presumption of Innocence
2.3.1.1 According to Art. 42(3) of the Constitution ‘[e]veryone shall be presumed
innocent of a charge until his guilt is determined by the ﬁnal judgment of a court’.
A restatement of this principle is found in Art. 5 of the Code of the Criminal
49 See for instance the Judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 January 2009 ref.
No. I OSK 63/08, of 21 September 2010 ref. No. I OSK 1550/09, of 27 July 2011 ref. No. I OSK
1336/10, of 24 July 2012 ref. No. I OSK 1031/11.
50 Case C-639/11 European Commission v. Republic of Poland [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:173.
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Procedure, which additionally stipulates that ‘unresolvable doubts shall be resolved
in favour of the accused’.
As mentioned in Sect. 1.2.3, the Constitutional Tribunal in the EAW case
decided that Art. 607t§1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that allowed the sur-
render of a Polish national under the EAW was inconsistent with Art. 55(1) of the
Constitution. Article 55 of the Constitution was amended in September 2006 in
order to give effect to Framework Decision 2002/584. Three additional reasons for
mandatory refusal of the execution of an EAW that are not provided for in
Framework Decision 2002/584 but are aimed at the protection of Polish citizens
were introduced in paras. 2 and 4 of Art. 55 Constitution. These are: the principle of
territoriality, the requirement of double criminality and the principle of protection of
rights and freedoms of persons and citizens. Accordingly, the Polish Constitution
and Art. 607p(1)–(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide grounds for refusal
to execute an EAW if this would ‘violate rights and freedoms of persons and
citizens’. The dominant scholarly view is that the provision should be interpreted
broadly and ought to comprise the rights which are guaranteed by the provisions of
acts of international law that bind Poland, as well as the rights and freedoms
protected by the Constitution.51
The issues of presumption of innocence, the right to defence and the right to a
fair trial arose before the Constitutional Tribunal in a case concerning a Polish
citizen accused of rape and assault in the city of Exeter in the UK in July 2006.52
The Polish court decided to surrender the accused on the basis of an EAW issued by
the British court under the condition that he would be transferred to Poland to serve
his sentence. In June 2007, the accused ﬁled a constitutional complaint, challenging
the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
insofar as they allow for the surrender of a person, even if it has not been deter-
mined that it is probable that the alleged offences have been committed by the
person who is the subject of the EAW.
The Constitutional Tribunal stated that, on the basis of Art. 607p(1)(5) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, it should be possible to refuse to execute an EAW in
cases where it is obvious for the court adjudicating on the execution of the warrant
that the person who is the subject of the warrant has not committed the act on which
the warrant is based. Such a decision may arise from ﬁndings made on the initiative
of the person who is the subject of the EAW, his defence counsel, the prosecutor as
a party to the proceedings, as well as ﬁndings made on the initiative of the court
adjudicating on the execution of the warrant, or from ﬁndings arising from the facts
which are known the court. At the same time, the Constitutional Tribunal
emphasised that this position should not be regarded as tantamount to allowing the
court adjudicating on the execution of the EAW to carry out detailed proceedings to
receive evidence with regard to the guilt of the person who is the subject of the
warrant. In the case of surrender to another EU Member State on the basis of an
51 Nita 2008, p. 93.
52 Judgment of 5 October 2010, ref. No. SK 26/08.
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EAW, the level of conﬁdence in the legitimacy of the request for surrender should
be higher than in the case of surrender on the basis of a ‘classic’ extradition request
to another state which is not necessarily bound by at least the minimum level of
guarantees provided by the ECHR.
2.3.1.2 A court that receives an EAW-based request for surrender ‘shall decide on
the surrender and provisional detention at a hearing in which both a public pros-
ecutor and defence counsel may participate’ (Art. 607l§1 Code of Criminal
Procedure). This provision does not mention the person indicated in the EAW.
However, the dominant view in the legal literature is that exclusion of the person
concerned from the hearing where the court decides on surrender or provisional
detention would violate the right to a fair trial contained in Art. 45(1) of the
Constitution and Art. 6 of the ECHR.53 In practice, the courts grant the person
indicated in the EAW a right to be heard even if the warrant is not accompanied by
a request to interrogate the prosecuted person.
Polish courts present a somewhat restrained approach towards arrest warrants
concerning Polish citizens. They consider the requirements speciﬁed in Art. 607p
and Art. 607r of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning grounds for mandatory
or optional refusal to execute an EAW. According to the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court, they may also consider whether the warrant has been issued by a
competent judicial authority and whether it contains the elements which are
essential for declaring it to be in compliance with the formal requirements.
A review may not, however, lead to substantive adjudication of whether there exist
sufﬁcient grounds for the execution of the warrant.54 In some cases the courts
decide to surrender the accused under the condition that he/she will be transferred to
Poland to serve his/her sentence (see Sect. 2.3.5.1).
In 2014, the Ombudsman formulated an ofﬁcial request to the Supreme Court to
adjudicate if the issuance of an EAW may in itself form a sufﬁcient basis for a
domestic court to decide on the provisional detention of an accused person without
analysing any further evidence. The Ombudsman had received a signiﬁcant number
of complaints from citizens alleging that in such cases Polish courts apply provi-
sional detention automatically without examining any evidence. One of the major
arguments against this practice was the presumption of innocence of a person
indicated in an EAW. In its order of 26 June 2014, the Supreme Court responded
that domestic courts must not examine evidence forming the basis for the issuance
of an EAW.55 However, a refusal to decide on provisional detention may be based
on the statutory grounds for refusal to execute the warrant, e.g. violation of the
rights and freedoms of persons speciﬁed in Art. 607p§1(5) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Supreme Court rejected the view of the Ombudsman that a decision
on the provisional detention of a person indicated in an EAW violates the pre-
sumption of innocence guaranteed by Art. 42(3) of the Constitution. According to
53 Nita 2014; Jaworski and Sołtysińska 2010, p. 329.
54 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 8 December 2008, ref. No. V KK 332/08.
55 Order of the Supreme Court decided by a panel of 7 judges of 26 June 2014, ref. No. I KZP 9/14.
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the Supreme Court, provisional detention is only a preventive measure, and the
accused shall be presumed innocent until his guilt is determined by the ﬁnal
judgment of a court.
2.3.2 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege
2.3.2.1 According to Art. 42(1) of the Constitution
[o]nly a person who has committed an act prohibited by a statute in force at the moment of
commission thereof, and which is subject to a penalty, shall be held criminally responsible.
This principle shall not prevent punishment of any act which, at the moment of its com-
mission, constituted an offence within the meaning of international law.
As speciﬁed in Sect. 2.3.1.1, the amendment to the Constitution of 2006
introduced an additional requirement of double criminality in Art. 55(2) that was
not provided for in Framework Decision 2002/584. Consequently, the extradition of
a Polish citizen may be granted provided that
the act covered by a request for extradition constituted an offence under the law in force in
the Republic of Poland or would have constituted an offence under the law in force in the
Republic of Poland if it had been committed within the territory of the Republic of Poland,
both at the time of its commitment and at the time of the making of the request.
Article 607w of the Code of Criminal Procedure abolishes the rule of double
criminality for 32 offences only in respect to non-Polish nationals. Therefore, if an
arrest warrant concerns a foreigner, the fact that an act is not a criminal offence
according to Polish law does not prevent the warrant from being executed, if it
concerns an act punishable in the issuing state by a penalty of at least 3 years of
imprisonment and constitutes one of the 32 types of offences. The requirement of
the rule of double criminality for acts committed by Polish citizens constitutes an
incorrect implementation of Framework Decision 2002/584. This issue has been
pointed out by legal experts in the course of legislative work on the amendment of
Art. 55 of the Constitution as well as in the legal commentary on the subject.56 The
European Commission has also indicated that this contradicts the Framework
Decision.57
It has also been pointed out that Art. 607w of the Code of Criminal Procedure
merely enumerates types of offences and contains imprecise and even ambiguous
phrases. The crimes are not deﬁned either in Art. 2(2) of Framework Decision
2002/584 or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and thus the qualiﬁcation of certain
criminal acts may be seriously impeded.58
56 Steinborn 2013.
57 Second evaluation report on the state of transposition of the Framework Decision on the
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, MEMO/07/288,
Brussels, 11 July 2007, p. 7.
58 Steinborn 2013.
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2.3.3 Fair Trial and In Absentia Judgments
2.3.3.1 Article 45(1) of the Constitution stipulates the right to a fair trial that covers
the right to a proper court proceeding which complies with the requirements of a fair
and public hearing. It must be emphasised that the right to a fair trial may be subject
to the limitations provided by Art. 31(3) of the Constitution (see Sect. 2.1.2).
According to Art. 479§1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ‘if an accused person
upon whom a summons has been served, fails to appear at the main trial, the court
may conduct the proceedings in the absence of the accused and, if his defence
counsel also fails to appear, the court may render a judgment by default’. A judgment
by default shall be served upon the accused. Within seven days, the accused may ﬁle
an objection to the judgment by default, in which he should provide a statement of
the reason for his failure to appear at the trial (Art. 482). With the transposition of
Framework Decision 2009/29959 into the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused
obtained two more procedural guarantees concerning judgments in absentia: a new
basis for the re-opening of the proceedings (Art. 540b) and an additional ground for
optional refusal to execute an EAW (Art. 607r§3).
The Constitutional Tribunal has considered trials in absentia in criminal and
civil proceedings (see Sect. 2.3.5), as well as trials in absentia under the provisions
of the Fiscal Penal Code.60 Such proceedings may be conducted against a person
who has committed a ﬁscal offence and who permanently resides abroad or whose
place of residence in Poland is unknown. The Constitutional Tribunal has stated
that Arts. 173–177 of the Fiscal Penal Code provide for sufﬁcient guarantees for
persons accused of a ﬁscal offence in view of the right to a fair trial (Art. 45(1) of
the Constitution) and the right of defence (Art. 42(2) of the Constitution). The
Tribunal added that these rights may be limited under the conditions speciﬁed in
Art. 31(3) Constitution. In this case, the constitutional value which was considered
to legitimise the limitation was the principle of legality in criminal law, understood
as the obligation to prosecute crimes.
2.3.4 The Right to a Fair Trial – Practical Challenges Regarding
a Trial Abroad
2.3.4.1 Poland does not provide the assistance of interpreters or legal aid to its
extradited citizens or residents who are involved in trials abroad since this lies
within the jurisdiction of the foreign courts. Assistance to extradited persons may be
provided by Polish diplomatic and consular ofﬁces. The Ombudsman safeguards
59 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework
Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA,
thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of
mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, [2009]
OJ L 81/24.
60 Judgment of 9 July 2002, ref. No. P 4/01.
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the liberties and rights of citizens as set forth in the Constitution and in other legal
acts. His competence is limited to the territory of Poland, but he may conduct an
inquiry concerning the performance of duties by Polish diplomatic and consular
missions in providing assistance to extradited citizens.
2.3.4.2 The Polish Ministry of Justice does not provide any statistical data on
persons who have been surrendered by a Polish court and have subsequently been
found innocent.
2.3.5 The Right to Effective Judicial Protection: The Principle
of Mutual Recognition in EU Criminal Law and Abolition
of the Exequatur in Civil and Commercial Matters
2.3.5.1 The issue of the enforceability of judgments in civil and commercial matters
in view of the right to a fair and public hearing guaranteed by Art. 45(1) of the
Constitution was the subject of a constitutional complaint in the Brussels I case (see
Sect. 1.3.4). The applicant questioned the second sentence of Art. 41 of the
Brussels I Regulation, according to which a debtor against whom enforcement is
sought should not at the stage of ﬁrst instance proceedings be entitled to make any
submissions on the application. The Constitutional Tribunal stated that the legal
construct of ex parte proceedings (i.e. where the defendant has not received notice
and, therefore, is neither present nor represented) is justiﬁed by the special character,
subject or function of such proceedings. In particular, it reflects the need to grant,
even temporarily, legal protection quickly or to preserve the element of surprise.
Without such proceedings, it would be impossible in many cases to fulﬁl the
function of civil proceedings, namely to grant legal protection. This means that the
interests of the two parties to the proceedings may justify postponing the exercise of
the right to a hearing of one party to the proceedings at a later stage. The Tribunal
concluded that such procedural solution implements the principle of the free
movement of judgments within the EU (as part of cooperation in judicial matters
among the Member States) and the principle of mutual trust in the administration of
justice in the EUMember States, which also apply to rulings issued by Polish courts.
The amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure abolishing the declaration of
enforceability for judgments and protection measures originating in another
Member State entered into force on 10 January 2015. It is in line with Regulation
1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters61 and Regulation 606/2013 on mutual recognition of
protection measures in civil matters62.
61 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters, [2012] OJ L 351/1.
62 Regulation (EU) No 606/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013
on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters, [2013] OJ L 181/4.
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The issue of mutual recognition of criminal judgments where the penalty imposed
by the court of another Member State is excessively lengthy arose in the aftermath of
the case referred to in Sect. 2.3.1.1. In January 2008, a British court sentenced a
Polish citizen to double life imprisonment. Due to the reservation made in the EAW,
he was transferred to Poland to serve his sentence. According to the Polish Criminal
Code, the maximum penalty for rape is 12 years of imprisonment with a maximum
penalty of 10 years for assault. Consequently, he requested that the court executing
the judgment adjust the penalty to the conditions set forth in Polish law. In March
2009, the Polish Supreme Court refused his claim. In January 2011, Art. 607s§4 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to allow domestic courts to amend a
penalty in line with the maximum punishment available for the offence in question
under Polish law, if the sentence imposed by a foreign court exceeds the upper limits
of the potential sanction for the offence in question. In November 2011, the court of
appeal adjudicated that in Poland, he must serve a 12-year prison sentence.
2.3.5.2 In Poland there was no debate about the suitability of transposing mutual
recognition from internal market matters to criminal law and civil and commercial
disputes. In the view of the experts, the rules concerning mutual recognition per-
taining to the free movement of goods cannot be easily transposed to criminal law,
since criminal law involves vital rights and freedoms of the utmost importance to
individuals, which must be safeguarded by very restrictive procedural guarantees.
2.3.5.3 The experts share the view that the national courts maintain both roles. They
provide judicial protection as well as perform the tasks imposed by EU law con-
cerning mutual recognition and judicial cooperation in criminal, civil and com-
mercial matters.
2.3.5.4 The issue of proportionality with regard to the EAW has been raised in the
legal literature and case law. The report of the European Commission of April 2011
indicated that Poland issued the greatest amount of arrest warrants between
2005–2009 (17,015).63 A Centre for European Policy Studies report (cf. the
Questionnaire) indicates that in 2005–2011, Poland issued 31% (24,577) of the total
number of warrants in the European Union (78,785).64 In legal writings it has been
pointed out that the courts of Ireland, Great Britain and Germany are faced with a
vast amount of Polish warrants in trivial cases such as ‘stealing a mobile phone or
two chickens’.65 In 2012, the High Court of Ireland relied on the principle of
proportionality and refused to surrender a Polish national accused of possession of a
small amount of marihuana.66 Moreover, Polish circuit courts have postulated that it
63 Report on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002
on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, Brussels,
11.4.2011, COM(2011) 175 ﬁnal, p. 12.
64 Carrera, Guild and Hernanz 2013, p. 38.
65 Górski 2010.
66 Judgment of the High Court of Ireland of 8 February 2102 in case MJLR v. Ostrowski, (2012)
IEHC 57.
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should be possible, due to the principle of proportionality, to assess the seriousness
of a crime and the possible penalty before issuing or executing an arrest warrant.67
For instance, in 2010 the Circuit Court in Łódź relied on the principle of propor-
tionality and Art. 49 of the Charter and refused to issue an arrest warrant for a
person accused of non-payment of alimony. In 2011, the Circuit Court in Białystok
based its refusal to issue an arrest warrant against a person accused of extortion of
child beneﬁts on the same argument.68
According to Art. 607b(1) of the Polish Code of Penal Procedure a warrant may
not be issued in connection with criminal proceedings against a person prosecuted for
an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to one year. A statute of 27 September
2013 that entered into force on 1 July 2015 introduced an additional obligation to
refuse to issue an EAW ‘if it is not required in view of the interests of justice’.
2.4 The Annulment of the Data Retention Directive
by the ECJ
2.4.1 Article 47 of the Constitution stipulates that ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to
legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and
to make decisions about his personal life’. According to Art. 49 of the Constitution,
‘[t]he freedom and privacy of communication shall be ensured. Any limitations
thereon may be imposed only in cases and in a manner speciﬁed by statute’. The
constitutional right to privacy may be limited under the conditions speciﬁed in Art.
31(3) of the Constitution (see Sect. 2.1.2) e.g. for the protection of the security of
the state or public order. According to Art. 51(2) of the Constitution, ‘[p]ublic
authorities shall not acquire, collect nor make accessible information on citizens
other than that which is necessary in a democratic state ruled by law’.
The Data Retention Directive69 was transposed by a statute of 24 April 2009 into
Arts. 180a–180g of the Telecommunications Law. In legal commentary it has been
pointed out that such provisions may signiﬁcantly affect the right to privacy of
ordinary citizens and allows for the conduct of full surveillance of society under the
guise of combatting terrorism.70 The provisions of the Telecommunications Law
67 Order of the Circuit Court in Tarnów of 26 October 2004, ref. No. II KOP 17/04, Order of the
Circuit Court in Łódź of 2 February 2011, ref. No. XVIII Kop 4/11, Order of the Circuit Court in
Gdańsk of 17 March 2011, ref. No. XIV Kop 12/11. See in more detail Ostropolski 2013, pp. 22–
23.
68 See in more detail Gardocka 2011, pp. 47–50.
69 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending
Directive 2002/58/EC, [2006] OJ L 105/54.
70 Suchorzewska 2010, p. 206.
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implementing the Directive will hopefully be rescinded by Parliament; however, the
relevant bill has not yet been submitted.
In April 2013 the Court of Appeal in Warsaw adjudicated the case of a Polish
journalist who had been placed under surveillance by the Central Anti-Corruption
Bureau (CBA) after a series of articles concerning the operational activities of this
authority.71 The CBA obtained the phone records of 10 journalists retained by the
telecommunication companies. In the view of the Court, the operations of the CBA
were unfounded, disproportionate and violated the journalists’ right to private and
family life as well as the freedom and privacy of communication.
On 30 July 2014, the Constitutional Tribunal issued a judgment with regard to
seven joined applications submitted by the Ombudsman and the Prosecutor
General.72 These applications concerned provisions on the conduct of operational
surveillance activities and the disclosure of communications data to the Police, the
Border Guard, the Military Police, authorities responsible for tax audits, the Internal
Security Agency, the Military Counter-Intelligence Service, the Central
Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Customs Service. The Constitutional Tribunal
stated that the data were obtained conﬁdentially and without any knowledge or
involvement of the persons on whom the information was gathered. Further, the
lack of independent supervision over that process posed a risk of abuse. The lack of
such supervision may not only contribute to unjustiﬁed interference in the rights
and freedoms of persons, but it may also pose a threat to the democratic mecha-
nisms of the exercise of state authority. Therefore, the Constitutional Tribunal
decided that certain provisions of the contested statutes were inconsistent with Art.
47 and Art. 49 in conjunction with Art. 31(3) of the Constitution.
2.5 Unpublished or Secret Legislation
2.5.1 The constitutional principles of legality (Art. 7) and legal certainty derived
from the rule of law (Art. 2) require that acts of universally binding law shall be
promulgated in a proper manner.73 According to Art. 88 of the Constitution, ‘[t]he
condition precedent for the coming into force of statutes, governmental regulations
and enactments of local law shall be the promulgation thereof’. Further, international
agreements ratiﬁed with prior consent granted by statute shall be promulgated in
accordance with the procedures required for statutes. The principles of, and proce-
dures for, promulgation of normative acts shall be speciﬁed by statute. According to
Art. 2 of the Act on Publishing Normative Acts of 2000, ‘promulgation of a nor-
mative act in a legal journal is obligatory’. The sources of universally binding law of
the Republic of Poland are published in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of
71 Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 26 April 2013, ref. No. I ACa 1002/12.
72 Judgment of 30 July 2014, ref. No. K 23/11.
73 See further Biernat and Niedźwiedź 2012, pp. 112–113.
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Poland (Dziennik Ustaw). According to the case law of the Constitutional Tribunal,
in order to satisfy the requirements laid down in Art. 88(1) of the Constitution, the
Journal of Laws shall not only be published but also shall be made available to the
public by means of distribution. It is not relevant whether the individual has actually
used the opportunity to acquaint himself with the normative act.74
On 1 May 2004 Poland acceded to the European Union, but the process of
translation of EU legislation continued until 2006. Before the ruling in
Skoma-Lux,75 the case law of the Polish administrative courts was divergent. Some
courts decided that legal acts published in one of the ofﬁcial languages of the EU
may be enforceable against Polish citizens from 1 May 2004,76 whereas other
courts held this to violate the principle of certainty of law guaranteed in Art. 2 of the
Constitution.77 The current position of the Supreme Administrative Court is that
acts of EU secondary law, in order to be enforceable against Polish citizens, must be
formulated in the Polish language and published in the Ofﬁcial Journal.
On 12 May 2011, the ECJ issued its judgment in case C-410/09 in response to a
preliminary question from the Polish Supreme Court concerning the enforcement of
certain regulatory obligations envisaged in Commission Guidelines of 2002 that
had not been published in Polish.78 The ECJ stated that Art. 58 of the Accession
Treaty does not preclude a national regulatory authority from referring to the
Commission Guidelines imposing certain regulatory obligations on an operator of
electronic communications services, notwithstanding the fact that those guidelines
have not been published in the Ofﬁcial Journal in Polish, even though that language
is an ofﬁcial language of the Union.
2.6 Rights and General Principles of Law in the Context
of Market Regulation: Property Rights, Legal Certainty,
Non-Retroactivity and Proportionality
2.6.1 The standard of protection of property rights, legal certainty, legitimate
expectations, non-retroactivity and proportionality in the ﬁeld of market regulation
74 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 21 December 1999, ref. No. K 4/99. The case related
to the statute that entered into force on 1 January 1999 and was published in the Journal of Laws
on 30 December 1998. The Journal of Laws was not distributed before the statute entered into
force and thus individuals did not have the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the normative
act. The Tribunal invalidated the provisions of the statute on a different constitutional basis and
decided not to adjudicate upon conformity with Art. 88(1) of the Constitution.
75 Case C-161/06 Skoma-Lux [2007] ECR I-10841.
76 Judgment of the Provincial Administrative Court in Łódź of 27 April 2007, ref. No. III SA/Łd
564/06.
77 Judgment of the Provincial Administrative Court in Bydgoszcz of 20 July 2005, ref. No. III I
SA/Bd 275/05.
78 Case C-410/09 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa [2011] ECR I-03853.
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is the same in Polish law irrespective of whether the obligations imposed on
individuals arise from national legislation, measures implementing EU law or
directly from EU acts.
For instance, the Constitutional Tribunal has declared that certain provisions of
an executive regulation concerning the amount of ﬁnes for infringements of rules
relating to ﬁshing are inconsistent with the principle of legal certainty guaranteed by
Art. 2 of the Constitution.79 The ﬁnes were the consequence of Commission
Regulation No 804/2007 of 9 July 2007 establishing a prohibition of ﬁshing for cod
in the Baltic Sea by vessels flying the flag of Poland.80 As a result of the judgment,
the Ministry of Agriculture annulled the ﬁnes imposed on Polish ﬁshermen for
illegal cod ﬁshing that were based on the repealed act.
2.7 The ESM Treaty, Austerity Programmes
and the Democratic, Rule-of-Law-Based State
2.7.1 In the ESM case, the Constitutional Tribunal considered an application,
submitted by a group of Sejm Deputies, which challenged a procedure for the
enactment of the Act on the ratiﬁcation of European Council Decision of 25 March
2011 amending Art. 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro
(2011/199/EU).81 The Tribunal stated that the amendment to Art. 136 of the TFEU
did not concern competences vested in the organs of state authority, and therefore
the ratiﬁcation did not entail the transfer of such competences upon an international
organisation or an international authority; therefore the Act was not inconsistent
with Art. 90 of the Constitution (see Sect. 1.3.2).
Moreover, the Tribunal indicated that the provisions of the Treaty Establishing
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty) did not bind Poland as a Member
State which does not belong to the eurozone. The decision whether to adopt the
ESM Treaty – and in accordance with what ratiﬁcation procedure – would be taken
by Poland upon accession to the eurozone. Also, the potential evaluation of the
constitutionality of the ESM Treaty might occur only at the moment of accepting
the binding force of this international agreement. Currently, Poland is not a party to
the Treaty, as it has neither signed it nor commenced the ratiﬁcation process. The
issue of the ratiﬁcation of the ESM Treaty will become one of the essential elements
of any future political decision concerning accession to the eurozone, provided that
the Treaty is still in force at that time. At the time of the judgment, the ESM Treaty
did not impose any obligations on Poland and did not cause any changes in the way
the Polish organs of public authority exercise their competence in ﬁnancial matters.
79 Judgment of 7 July 2009, ref. No. K 13/08.
80 [2007] OJ L 180/3.
81 Judgment of 26 June 2013, ref. No. K 33/12.
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2.7.2 In March 2013, a group of Deputies and Senators challenged the constitu-
tionality of the procedure for the ratiﬁcation of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the Fiscal Compact). In the
view of the applicants, the Fiscal Compact confers the competences of national
authorities upon an international organisation, which means that the ratiﬁcation
statute should have been adopted in accordance with the Art. 90(1) procedure,
rather than the Art. 89 procedure.82 The proceedings before the Constitutional
Tribunal were discontinued since after the parliamentary elections in 2015 the
Members of the new Parliament did not uphold their motion.
2.7.3 Poland has not been subject to a bailout or austerity programme. According to
the well-established case law of the Constitutional Tribunal, the ﬁnancial equilib-
rium of the state is a constitutional value taken into consideration in assessing the
constitutionality of law.83
2.8 Judicial Review of EU Measures: Access to Justice
and the Standard of Review
2.8.1 Between 2006 and September 2015, Polish courts submitted 81 requests for a
preliminary ruling.84 The most requests were submitted by Polish administrative
courts, with 28 by the Supreme Administrative Court and 22 by provincial
administrative courts.85 The Supreme Court issued 10 requests, and the common
courts 21 requests.86 Poland is one of the largest EU countries, yet it is a Member
State from which the ECJ receives one of the lowest number of requests for a
preliminary ruling.87 During this period, Polish courts only submitted questions
with regard to the interpretation of EU primary and secondary law (mainly regu-
lations and directives), but not with regard to the validity of EU measures. Problems
with the application of EU law occur primarily in the ﬁeld of customs, indirect
taxes, social security, road transportation, veterinary matters, EU citizenship,
agricultural law and intellectual property law.88
82 Case ref. No. K 11/13.
83 Judgment of 19 December 2012, ref. No. K 9/12.
84 Until 2006, Polish courts submitted only one request for a preliminary ruling; see Case C-313/
05 Brzeziński [2007] ECR I-00519.
85 List of cases available at: http://www.nsa.gov.pl/pytania-prejudycjalne-wsa-i-nsa.php.
86 List of cases available at: http://www.iws.org.pl/analizy-i-raporty/pytania-prejudycjalne-
polskich-sadow-powszechnych.
87 According to the Annual Report of the Court of Justice, Polish courts submitted 14 requests in
2014, 11 in 2013, 6 in 2012, 11 in 2011 and 8 in 2010. Court of Justice of the European Union,
Annual report 2014, Luxembourg 2015, p. 122.
88 Biernat 2009, p. 29.
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In July 2015 the Constitutional Tribunal decided to submit its ﬁrst reference for a
preliminary ruling concerning the validity of the provisions of Directive 2006/112
on the common system of value added tax (VAT Directive).89 The questions for-
mulated by the Tribunal concern the rate of VAT on books published in digital form
and other electronic publications.90 In its judgement of 7 March 2017 the Court of
Justice stated that despite different VAT rates on electronic and printed publica-
tions, the contested provisions were valid.
2.8.2 In Poland a declaration of invalidity of a statute or legal provision issued by a
central organ of the state lies solely within the competence of the Constitutional
Tribunal. As opposed to other constitutional courts, the Polish Constitutional
Tribunal does not review rulings or decisions issued in individual cases, rather
controls normative acts serving as legal grounds for a given ruling or decision.
According to statistical data, in 2014 the Tribunal issued 69 judgments and in 36
cases (52%) declared at least one provision questioned by the claimants to be
unconstitutional. The Tribunal declared legal provisions to be invalid in 39 cases
(55%) in 2013, in 35 cases (52%) in 2012, in 25 cases (42%) in 2011 and in 37
cases (54%) in 2010.91 The most common ground for a declaration of unconsti-
tutionality of a legal norm was violation of the rule of law and legal principles
derived from Art. 2 of the Constitution (see Sect. 2.1.1), the right to a fair trial, the
principle of proportionality and the transgression of the authorisation contained in a
statute in issuing a regulation by the executive. The Supreme Administrative Court
and provincial administrative courts exercise control over the performance of public
administration. According to statistical data, in 2013 provincial administrative
courts examined 75,372 claims, which led to the annulment of administrative action
in 17,149 cases. The success rate was approximately 24.36% in 2013, 22.3% in
2012, 22.5% in 2011 and 23% in 2010.92 Based on these statistics, it must be
concluded that the review of legality of national legislation, executive regulations
and administrative action is more successful than the review of legality of EU
measures in the EU courts.
The experts share the view that the EU courts represent a protective approach
towards EU institutions and organs in actions for annulment and failure to act. The
underlying motive is to ensure the effectiveness of EU decision-making. A very
restrictive approach is also demonstrated in claims for damages against EU insti-
tutions submitted on the basis of Art. 340(2) TFEU, since in the view of the ECJ
such claims may hinder the ability of the institutions to fully exercise their com-
petences in the general interest. In the last 60 years, the EU courts have awarded
damages in only 43 cases. However, in recent years, the ECJ has put more emphasis
89 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added
tax, [2006] OJ L 347/1.
90 Case C-390/15 RPO [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:174.
91 Statistical data available at: http://trybunal.gov.pl/publikacje/informacje-o-problemach-
wynikajacych-z-dzialalnosci-i-orzecznictwa-tk/od-2003/.
92 Statistical data available at: http://www.nsa.gov.pl/statystyki-wsa.php.
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on the protection of fundamental rights speciﬁed in the Charter.93 Also in deciding
actions for damages the EU courts underline that individuals may not bear the
consequences of flagrant and inexcusable misconduct by the EU institutions.94
2.8.3 The Polish Constitutional Tribunal does not take an overly active approach to
review of the constitutionality of normative acts. In adjudicating a case, the
Tribunal is bound by the limits of the application, question of law or complaint. The
result of such constitutional review of the law is that the obligation to identify the
grounds for the alleged unconstitutionality of a challenged provision is imposed on
the participants in the proceedings (parties). Such a concept of constitutional
judiciary is a derivative of the presumption of constitutionality of the law and the
principle of stability of the legal order.
The administrative courts decide within the limits of a particular case, however
without being bound by the claims and legal bases indicated in the complaint. The
court is able to examine the content of a contested act or action of an administrative
authority in terms of its compliance with substantive and procedural law. The
Supreme Court and administrative and common courts may review the legality of
regulations issued by the executive and may refuse to apply such a regulation in a
particular case. However, they can not decide on the validity of a regulation since
this lies solely within the competence of the Constitutional Tribunal. For statistical
data on the proportion of validity challenges concerning domestic acts that have led
to annulment and the main grounds for annulment, see Sect. 2.8.2.
2.8.4 The Polish Constitutional Tribunal reviews domestic statutes implementing
EU legislation in the same manner as other parliamentary statutes or legal acts
issued by central organs of the state.95 In its Brussels I judgment, the Constitutional
Court recognised its competence to directly review EU secondary law in the con-
stitutional complaint procedure (see Sect. 1.3.4). The Tribunal indicated that it
would examine the conformity of norms of EU law with the Constitution in future
constitutional complaints in a special way and adopted an approach similar to that
of the German Constitutional Court in Solange II96 or the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) in Bosphorus,97 recognising a presumption of legality with
93 Joined cases C-402/05 and C-415/05 Kadi [2008] ECR I-06351; Joined cases C-92/09 and
C-93/09 Volker und Marcus Schecke and Eifert [2010] ECR I-11063; Joined cases C-293/12 and
C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
94 Case T-351/03 Schneider Electric [2007] ECR II-02237; Case T-47/03 Sison v. Council [2007]
ECR II-00073; Case T-429/05 Artegodan v. Commission [2010] ECR II-00491; Case T-333/10
Animal Trading Company [2013] ECLI:EU:T:2013:451.
95 See for example the Judgments of 27 April 2005 ref. No. P 1/05 (see Sect. 1.2.3) and of 5
October 2010 ref. No. SK 26/08 (see Sect. 2.3.1) concerning the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure implementing Council Framework Decision
2002/584 on the European Arrest Warrant.
96 19 BVerfGE 73, 339 [1986] (Solange II).
97 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim S  irketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98,
ECHR 2005-VI.
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regard to EU law. An individual submitting a constitutional complaint which
challenges the conformity of an act of EU law with the Constitution is required to
demonstrate that that the legal act undermines the level of protection of rights and
freedoms, in comparison with the level of protection guaranteed by the
Constitution. It follows that the Polish constitutional court placed emphasis on
examining whether a particular EU legal act offers an adequate level of protection
of rights and freedoms, rather than taking the EU legal system in general into
consideration.
2.8.5 The Constitutional Tribunal in its jurisprudence has expressed the view that a
level of protection of an individual’s rights that arises from EU law that is lower
than the level of protection guaranteed by the Constitution would be inacceptable.98
The constitutional norms on the rights and freedoms of the individual set a
threshold which may not be lowered or challenged as a result of the implementation
of EU legal acts. At the same time, the Tribunal has underlined that the Charter, the
ECHR and the constitutional traditions of the Member States set a high level of
protection of fundamental rights in the EU. These circumstances prove a signiﬁcant
axiological similarity between Polish law and EU law. Therefore, the risk of a
potential gap between the levels of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed in
these legal systems is not high.
2.8.6 The issue of equal treatment of individuals falling within the scope of EU law
and national law has arisen in a few cases before the Constitutional Tribunal. For
instance, in the Brussels I case the legal situation of the complainant (the debtor)
was regulated by Council Regulation 44/2001 (see Sect. 1.3.4). Article 41 of this
Regulation excludes a debtor from proceedings before a court of ﬁrst instance in
cases concerning the enforceability of a ruling issued by a court of another EU
Member State. If the case had concerned the enforceability of a judgment from a
non-EU Member State, the Polish Code of Civil Procedure would have applied.
According to Art. 11511§2 of the Code, a debtor, upon being served a motion for
enforcement of a judgment, is allowed to present his or her position before the court
of ﬁrst instance.
2.9 Other Constitutional Rights and Principles
2.9.1 Similar issues concerning the implementation of EU law as reported in the
Questionnaire arose in Poland in relation to the regional operational programmes
within the European Regional Development Fund. The implementation systems for
regional operational programmes were usually adopted in the form of a resolution
issued by the governing bodies of a voivodeship (province) and regulated certain
rights and freedoms of individuals in relation to the procedure for the selection of
98 Judgment ref. No. K 18/04 and ref. No. SK 45/09.
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projects and the related appellate procedure. Such resolutions do not fulﬁl the
constitutional requirements for determining the rights and obligations of individuals
within the meaning of Art. 87 of the Constitution (enumerating the acts of uni-
versally binding law: statutes, executive regulations or enactments of local law).
The Constitutional Tribunal declared that certain provisions of the Act of 6
December 2006 on rules for carrying out development policy were inconsistent
with Art. 87 of the Constitution.99
2.10 Common Constitutional Traditions
2.10.1 Analysis of the jurisprudence reveals that the ECJ, in assessing the common
constitutional traditions100 and legal principles common to the laws of the Member
States speciﬁed in Art. 340(2) TFEU,101 uses the method of evaluative comparative
law (‘wertende Rechtsvergleichung’). Therefore, even a legal principle that is
recognised in a minority of national legal systems may be identiﬁed as forming part
of EU law, if it best meets the requirements of the EU legal system. In the view of
the experts, the following rights and values may be regarded as part of the common
constitutional traditions of the Member States as set out in Art. 6(3) TEU and Art.
52(4) of the Charter: the principle of equality, the principle of proportionality, legal
certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, the right to a fair trial, the
protection of property, the freedom to express opinions, the right of defence,
non-retroactivity of law and nulla poena sine lege.
2.10.2 Recognising the general principles of Union law, the ECJ does not rely on
the interpretation of the constitutional provisions of the Member States, but rather
refers to the principles resulting from the constitutional traditions of the Member
States. This way of formulating the general principles of Union law avoids the
allegation that the domestic provisions or standards of certain Member States will
determine the content of EU law, which would be tantamount to a reversal of the
primacy of EU law over the law of the Member States.102 In view of the protection
of the rights of individuals, it would be suitable for the ECJ to refer to the ‘common
constitutional traditions’ as a more direct source of EU law or even long-standing
rights and values prescribed in the constitution of a given Member State, as long as
this would not violate the primacy and autonomy of Union law.
99 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 12 December 2011, ref. No. P 1/11.
100 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 29 April 2010 in Case C-550/07 Akzo Nobel
Chemicals [2010] ECR I-08301, para. 94.
101 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 20 February 2008 in Joined cases C-120/06 P
and C-121/06 FIAMM and Fedon [2008] ECR I-06513, para. 55.
102 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 01125, para. 3; Wróbel 2010,
p. 50.
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2.11 Article 53 of the Charter and the Issue of Stricter
Constitutional Standards
2.11.1 The Constitutional Tribunal represents the view that a lower level of pro-
tection of an individual’s rights arising from Union law compared to the level of
protection guaranteed by the Polish Constitution would be unacceptable (see
Sect. 2.8.5). Further, in its jurisprudence the Supreme Court invokes the provisions
of the Polish Constitution over the provisions of the ECHR, if the former offer a
higher standard of protection for the individual.103 Analysis of the jurisprudence of
the Polish courts reveals that the Charter is invoked in exceptional cases and only as
additional justiﬁcation to the outcome determined on the basis of Polish law. The
Charter is relatively frequently invoked by the parties to the proceedings; however,
it is referred to without adequate justiﬁcation or as additional argumentation in
support of statements based on national law.104
2.12 Democratic Debate on Constitutional Rights
and Values
2.12.1 At the time of the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant Framework
Decision in 2002 there was no public deliberation in Poland since the country did
not accede to the EU until May 2004. During the process of implementing the
Decision through the Code of Penal Procedure by virtue of the Act of 18 March
2004,105 there was academic and political debate, which led to the constitutional
amendment discussed in Sects. 1.2.3 and 2.3.
At the time of adoption and implementation of the Data Retention Directive
through the Telecommunications Law by virtue of the Act of 24 April 2009 there
was no public deliberation concerning the defence of citizens’ rights. However, on
13 May 2014 the Committee on Human Rights of the Senate organised an expert
debate on the legal consequences of the judgment in the case Digital Rights Ireland
and its impact on the use of telecommunications data by police and other public
authorities for the purpose of preventing and combating crime.
103 In its Order of 9 September 1998, ref No. III RN 73/98, the Supreme Court held that a
foreigner who does not have a valid passport, valid visa or permanent residence card but who has a
valid certiﬁcate of registration of an application instituting proceedings for refugee status, resides
lawfully within the territory of Poland and is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time guaranteed by Art. 45(1) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court stated that this
constitutional provision offers a wider scope of protection than Art. 6(1) of the ECHR that is
limited to civil rights and obligations or criminal charges.
104 Biernat 2012, pp. 74–78; Półtorak 2014, p. 17.
105 Act of 18 March 2004 on the amendment of the Law – on the Criminal Code, the Law – on the
Code of Penal Procedure and the Law – on the Code of Petty Offences (Journal of Laws No. 69,
Item 626).
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It is worth mentioning that one of the largest public debates in Poland, as well as
public manifestations, took place in February 2012 and concerned the right to
privacy of Internet users in view of the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA).
2.12.2 Statutes implementing EU law are subject to preventive and subsequent
control by the Constitutional Tribunal. At the stage of implementation of EU law, a
statute may be subject to preventive control (i.e. before the statute enters into force).
This can only be initiated by the President who may, before signing a statute, refer it
to the Constitutional Tribunal for adjudication of its conformity to the Constitution
(Art. 122(3) of the Constitution). For example, the President initiated control of the
Act of 5 December 2008 concerning the organisation of the ﬁsh market imple-
menting Council Regulation 1224/2009 establishing a Community control system
for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common ﬁsheries policy.106,107 He
successfully challenged the conformity of the requirement that all ﬁsheries products
must ﬁrst be marketed or registered with an auction centre, registered buyer or
producer organisations with Art. 22 of the Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of
economic activity. In the view of the Experts, the present system allows sufﬁcient
space for constitutional review at the stage of implementing EU law. However, if
serious constitutional problems are identiﬁed, a Member State is still obliged to
respect and ensure the full effectiveness of EU law in the domestic legal system.
Otherwise, infringement proceedings as deﬁned in Art. 258–260 TFEU may be
initiated.
2.12.3 The Experts support the recommendation to suspend the application of EU
measures and carry out a review if important constitutional issues are identiﬁed by a
number of constitutional courts. Moreover, if such unconstitutionality has been
identiﬁed, it should be recognised as a defence on the part of the Member State in
an infringement proceeding.
In the Brussels I case the Constitutional Tribunal considered the effects of a
potential judgment that would ﬁnd norms of EU secondary legislation inconsistent
with the Constitution (see Sect. 1.3.4). In the context of acts of Polish law,
inconsistency with the Constitution results in a declaration that the unconstitutional
norms are no longer legally binding (Arts. 190(1) and (3) of the Constitution). With
regard to acts of EU secondary legislation, such a result would be impossible, as it
is not the organs of the Polish state that decide whether such acts are legally binding
or not. The consequence of such judgment would be to rule out the possibility that
the act of EU secondary legislation would be applied by the organs of the state and
would have any legal effects in Poland. Therefore, the ruling of the Constitutional
Tribunal would result in a suspension of the application of the unconstitutional
norms of EU law in the territory of the Republic of Poland. The Constitutional
106 [2009] OJ L 343/1.
107 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13 October 2010 ref. No. Kp 1/09, OTK No. 8A/
2010, item 74.
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Tribunal also noted that such situation may lead to proceedings against Poland by
the European Commission and an action before the ECJ for the infringement of
obligations under the Treaties.
2.13 Experts’ Analysis on the Protection of Constitutional
Rights in EU Law
2.13.1 The Experts do not share the concerns about an overall reduction in the
standard of protection of constitutional rights and the rule of law in the context of
EU law.
2.13.2 Not applicable.
2.13.3 The Experts submit the view that the ECJ should have broader recourse to
the referring court or tribunal and request clariﬁcation where the circumstances of
the case are imprecise or the formulation of a preliminary question raises consid-
erable doubts. All constitutional courts of EU Member States should have the right
to submit observations to the ECJ in a preliminary ruling procedure initiated by one
of the national courts, if the case involves issues of fundamental constitutional
importance. The lack of such provision prevented the Czech Constitutional Court
from submitting its observations in Landtová.108
The participation of constitutional courts in the preliminary ruling procedure
would be advisable in the following situations:
(1) the threat of substantive differences between EU law and the constitutional
law of the Member States (as in the case of Landtová);
(2) a conflict of the duty of a national court to ﬁle a legal question with the
constitutional court of that Member State and its duty to submit a preliminary
question to the ECJ.
2.13.4 In the view of the Experts, it would be desirable if Poland were to withdraw
from Protocol (No 30) on the application of the Charter to Poland and to the United
Kingdom, because the Protocol has more political than legal character.109 The
Experts would also recommend an amendment to the Constitution aimed at sim-
plifying the procedure for implementing EU law into the national legal system and
alleviating the strict standards governing the system of the sources of law (e.g. by
using government decrees). The problem especially arises in relation to measures
adopted in relation to the European Structural Funds (see Sect. 2.9.1).
108 Case C-399/09 Landtová [2011] ECR I-05573.
109 Biernat 2012, p. 86. Cf. OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, pp. 313–314.
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3 Constitutional Issues in Global Governance
3.1 Constitutional Rules on International Organisations
and the Ratiﬁcation of Treaties
3.1.1 The rules regarding the transfer of competences of the organs of state
authority to an international organisation or international organ are speciﬁed in Art.
90 of the Constitution (see Sect. 1.2.1). While Art. 90(1) of the Constitution does
not use the word ‘European Union’, it was originally seen as the provision that
provided the basis for Polish accession to the European Union. To date, it has not
been applied to any international organisation other than the European Union,
although such a possibility was considered with regard to Poland’s ratiﬁcation of
the Statute of the International Criminal Court, as well as in the context of an
agreement with the United States of America concerning a missile defence
system.110
The Council of Ministers is authorised to conclude international agreements
requiring ratiﬁcation and to accept and renounce other international agreements
(Arts. 146(4)10) of the Constitution). The President, as a representative of the state
in foreign affairs, ratiﬁes and renounces international agreements (Art. 133(1)1) of
the Constitution). The Constitution provides for three procedures for ratiﬁcation of
international agreements.
In the ﬁrst procedure the Council of Ministers submits an international agree-
ment which does not require consent granted by a statute (Art. 89(2)) to the
President for ratiﬁcation. The second procedure involves the Parliament and
requires granting consent to ratiﬁcation by statute. The Sejm and the Senate must
pass bills by a simple majority vote, in the presence of at least one-half of the
statutory number of their members. The choice of one of the above procedures is
determined by the subject matter of the particular international agreement. Prior
consent by statute is required for: (1) peace, alliances, political or military treaties;
(2) freedoms, rights or obligations of citizens, as speciﬁed in the Constitution;
(3) Poland’s membership in an international organisation; (4) considerable ﬁnancial
responsibilities imposed on the state; (5) matters regulated by statute or those in
respect of which the Constitution requires the form of a statute (Art. 89(1)).
The third procedure applies to international agreements transferring competences
of the organs of state authority. Consent can only be granted by a statute or
nationwide referendum (Art. 90(2) and (3)). The consent for ratiﬁcation of an
international agreement speciﬁed in Art. 90 of the Constitution has higher
requirements and involves a greater degree of democratic control (see Sect. 1.2.1).
3.1.2 Before the Constitution of 1997 there were no constitutional provisions
determining the status of international agreements in the domestic legal order or the
ratiﬁcation procedures. The rules concerning the ratiﬁcation of treaties and transfer
110 Wyrozumska and Kranz 2001, pp. 15–35; Wyrozumska and Płachta 2001, pp. 87 et seq.
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of competences to international organisations were developed in the course of
preparatory work for the Polish Constitution of 1997 (as to Art. 90, see Sect. 1.2.1).
The purpose of these provisions was to determine the role of the Council of
Ministers, the President and the Parliament in the ratiﬁcation procedures and to
strengthen democratic control upon the conclusion of international agreements.
Article 89 is contained in Chapter III of the Constitution entitled ‘Sources of Law’.
The intention of the drafters was to adopt a wide catalogue of international
agreements which must be ratiﬁed through consent granted by statute as a general
rule for the conclusion of agreements.111 In legal commentary, it has been stated
that the criteria formulated in Art. 89(1)(1)–(5) of the Constitution are far from clear
and leave the Parliament a large margin of discretion in deciding whether an
international agreement requires consent granted by statute.112 However, it is
impossible to identify the general guidelines indicating precisely which categories
of international agreements shall be subject to ratiﬁcation in accordance with Art.
89(1) of the Constitution, based on constitutional provisions. Each international
agreement should be considered individually, as to its nature, subject matter and the
circumstances surrounding its conclusion.113
3.1.3 In the legal literature the view has been expressed that the rule that a
nationwide referendum expressing consent for ratiﬁcation of an international
agreement by which competences are transferred to an international organisation is
binding only if at least 50% of citizens eligible to vote participate, is too strict.114 In
2010, the Parliament unsuccessfully considered proposals concerning the transfer of
competences and other provisions with regard to Poland’s membership in the
European Union (see Sect. 1.2.4).
3.1.4 See Sects. 1.5.3 and 2.13.4.
3.2 The Position of International Law in National Law
3.2.1 The Constitution of 1997 is the ﬁrst basic law in Poland deﬁning the position
of international law in the domestic legal order. The general principle is expressed
in Art. 9 of the Constitution and states that ‘[t]he Republic of Poland shall respect
international law binding upon it’. It is the expression of the classic rule of pacta
sunt servanda. In legal commentary and domestic case law the prevailing view is
that the term ‘international law’ covers international treaties, international custom
and general principles of international law. Article 9 of the Constitution is not a
merely declaratory provision but rather obliges all state authorities to respect
111 Szymański 2010, pp. 504–505.
112 Banaszak 2012.
113 Wyrozumska 2006a, p. 177.
114 Biernat 2002a, pp. 41–65.
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international law in the performance of their duties, and to interpret Polish law in a
manner consistent with international law.115 This indicates the openness of the
Polish legal system to international law.116
The position of international agreements in the national legal order is determined
by Art. 91 of the Constitution. A ratiﬁed international agreement, after promulgation
in the Journal of Laws, constitutes part of the domestic legal order and shall
be applied directly, unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute
(Art. 91(1) of the Constitution). Such provision refers to so-called self-executing or
directly applicable norms. An international agreement ratiﬁed upon prior consent
granted by statute has precedence over a statute if the agreement cannot be recon-
ciled with the provisions of the statute. This concerns the primacy of application of
international agreements by state authorities and domestic courts and it does not
affect the validity of national law (Art. 91(2) of the Constitution). The Constitutional
Tribunal has the sole competence to adjudicate on the conformity of a statute with
ratiﬁed international agreements and to derogate from incompatible national law
(Art. 188(2) of the Constitution). In the legal commentary and the jurisprudence of
the courts, the dominant view is that an international agreement ratiﬁed without
consent granted by statute does not have precedence over statutes.117
As speciﬁed in Sect. 1.2.1, Art. 91(3) of the Constitution determines the position
of law enacted by an international organisation, if an agreement, ratiﬁed by the
Republic of Poland, so provides. Accordingly, the law adopted by the international
organisation shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict
with a statute. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal clearly demonstrates
that law enacted by an international organisation, in this case EU secondary law,
does not have precedence over the Constitution.118
3.2.2 Taking into consideration the interaction between international and national
law, in legal commentary the prevailing view is that the monist system is
predominant in Poland (incorporation doctrine).119 This statement is based on
Art. 91(1) of the Constitution. The jurisprudence of the national courts is not
entirely clear on this matter, and there have been rulings based on a dualist
approach (transformation doctrine).120
115 Biernat and Niedźwiedź 2012, p. 93.
116 Wasilkowski 2006, pp. 9 et seq.
117 Garlicki 2010a, p. 144; Wyrozumska 2006a, pp. 578–579.
118 In case ref. No. SK 45/09 the Constitutional Tribunal directly adjudicated the conformity of
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 to the Polish Constitution and issued a judgment on the merits.
119 Biernat and Niedźwiedź 2012, p. 121; Wyrozumska 1996, p. 24; Szafarz 1998, p. 3;
Wasilkowski 1998, p. 86.
120 Wyrozumska 2006a, pp. 592–599; Wyrozumska 2006b, pp. 45–50.
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3.3 Democratic Control
3.3.1 The foreign policy of Poland is conducted by the Council of Ministers
(Art. 146(1) of the Constitution), which includes negotiating and signing interna-
tional agreements. The Act on International Agreements of 2000 speciﬁes that
Parliament is involved when ratiﬁcation of an international agreement requires the
form of a statute under the provisions of Arts. 89(1) and 90 of the Constitution.
Withdrawal from an international agreement ratiﬁed with the consent referred to in
Arts. 89(1) and 90 of the Polish Constitution also requires consent granted by
statute (Art. 22(2) of the Act on International Agreements). In the case of other
international agreements, the involvement of the Sejm is limited to receiving
information from the Prime Minister on any intention to submit an agreement to the
President for ratiﬁcation (Art. 89(2) of the Constitution; see Sect. 3.1.1).121
However, according to Art. 15(4) of the Act on International Agreements, if the
Sejm issues a negative opinion on the choice of such procedure within 30 days after
notiﬁcation, the Council of Ministers must reconsider its position on the matter. The
Council of Ministers may decide to change its position and submit the agreement to
the Sejm for consent granted by statute or decide to submit the agreement directly to
the President. The President may ratify the agreement, share the view of the Sejm
and return it to the Council of Ministers or submit the case to the Constitutional
Tribunal for adjudication on the mode of ratiﬁcation in conformity with the
Constitution. Such procedure preserves the institutional balance in the ratiﬁcation of
international agreements.122
The Marshal of the Sejm, the Marshal of the Senate, 50 Deputies or 30 Senators
may submit an application to the Constitutional Tribunal for control of the con-
formity of an international agreement to the Constitution (Art. 188(1) of the
Constitution). This is the so-called subsequent control (kontrola następcza) of
normative acts and relates only to international agreements that have been ratiﬁed
and form part of the Polish legal system.123 In legal commentary, the view has been
expressed that both chambers of the Polish Parliament should have competence to
initiate preventive control of international agreements.124 However, this would
require the amendment of the Constitution, since such control lies solely within the
competence of the President.
The Sejm usually holds debates on current matters of foreign policy. On most
occasions the debates relate to information submitted by the Council of Ministers
121 In view of Art. 12(3) of the Act on International Agreements, international agreements that do
not require ratiﬁcation are subject to approval by the Council of Ministers.
122 Wyrozumska 2006a, p. 194.
123 In its Order of 21 May 2013, ref. No. K 11/13, the Constitutional Tribunal dismissed the
application ﬁled by 50 Deputies concerning the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance
in the Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact), since at the time of submitting the
application the agreement had not yet been ratiﬁed.
124 Wyrozumska 2006a, p. 74.
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on Poland’s participation in the activities of the European Union and the ratiﬁcation
of international agreements.125
3.3.2 A nationwide referendum is one of the ways for obtaining consent for rati-
ﬁcation of an international agreement transferring competences of the organs of
state authority to an international organisation or international organ (Art. 90(3) of
the Constitution). This provision served as the basis for the referendum on the EU
Accession Treaty in 2003. It cannot be excluded that the Sejm or the President may
order a nationwide referendum as speciﬁed in Art. 125 of the Constitution to decide
on matters of particular importance to the state.
3.4 Judicial Review
3.4.1 As stated above, Art. 9 of the Constitution stipulates that the Republic of
Poland shall respect international law binding upon it (see Sect. 3.2.1). This pro-
vision must be reconciled with Art. 8, which provides that the Constitution shall be
the supreme law of the Republic of Poland. To this end, the Constitutional Tribunal
acquired the competence to adjudicate upon the conformity of international
agreements to the Constitution (Art. 188(1) of the Constitution). International
agreements are subject to preventive control (kontrola prewencyjna) or subsequent
control (kontrola następcza). The ﬁrst type of control can be initiated only by the
President who may turn to the Constitutional Tribunal before ratiﬁcation of an
agreement with a request to adjudicate upon its conformity to the Constitution
(Art. 133(2) of the Constitution). Subsequent control may be initiated by the
President, the Marshal of the Sejm, the Marshal of the Senate, the Prime Minister,
50 Deputies, 30 Senators, the First President of the Supreme Court, the President of
the Supreme Administrative Court, the Public Prosecutor-General, the President of
the Supreme Chamber of Control and the Ombudsman. International agreements
may also be questioned by the National Council of the Judiciary in cases related to
the independence of the courts and judges (Art. 186(2) of the Constitution), by
national courts referring a question of law (Art. 193 of the Constitution) and by
individuals in cases of constitutional complaints (Art. 79 of the Constitution).
Among the international agreements that have been submitted to the Tribunal for
subsequent control are the Accession Treaty, Protocol No. 4 to the Association
Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, the Extradition Treaty between the United States of
America and the Republic of Poland and the Fiscal Compact.126 A judgment of the
125 See as an example the list of Debates of the Sejm, 7th term available in English at: http://oide.
sejm.gov.pl/oide/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14684&Itemid=717.
126 In cases ref. No. K 18/04 (the Association Treaty), ref. No. SK 54/05 (Protocol No 4 to the
Association Treaty), ref. No. K 32/09 (the Lisbon Treaty) and ref. No. SK 6/10 (Extradition
Treaty) the Constitutional Tribunal decided that the contested international agreements were in
conformity with the Constitution. Case ref. No. K 11/13 concerning the Fiscal Compact has not yet
been decided.
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Constitutional Tribunal in which it is held that an international agreement is
inconsistent with the Constitution results in a declaration that the unconstitutional
norms are no longer legally binding on the territory of Poland (Art. 190(1) of the
Constitution). However, the Constitutional Tribunal may specify another date for
the end of the binding force of an international agreement and postpone the effects
of its judgment for a period not exceeding 12 months (Art. 190(3) of the
Constitution). Such decision provides time to bring the agreement into conformity
with the Constitution.
3.5 The Social Welfare Dimension of the Constitution
3.5.1 In the period immediately following the political transformation in 1989, the
IMF and the World Bank had a great influence on the radical economic reforms
undertaken in Poland. The assessment of these reforms differs. On one hand they
had a positive impact on the prompt creation of the basis of a market economy. On
the other, they created some negative social consequences involving the impover-
ishment of certain social groups, such as employees of large state agricultural farms.
These reforms took place before the adoption of the current Constitution which
contains provisions on economic and social rights (Arts. 64–76). In a number of
cases, the Constitutional Tribunal has accepted the admissibility of the temporary
limitation of social rights during the economic crisis (which in Poland was less
severe than in other countries).127
3.5.2 See Sect. 2.7.3.
3.6 Constitutional Rights and Values in Selected Areas
of Global Governance
3.6.1 In its judgment of 21 September 2011, the Constitutional Tribunal decided
that Art. 4(1) of the Extradition Treaty of 10 July 1996 between the United States of
America and the Republic of Poland is consistent with Arts. 55(1) and (2) in
conjunction with Art. 2 of the Constitution (see Sect. 3.4). The complainant, who
held both American and Polish citizenship, contested the provision stipulating that
‘[n]either contracting State shall be bound to extradite its own nationals, but the
executive authority of the requested State shall have the power to extradite such
persons if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper and possible to do so’. In the
opinion of the complainant such provision was inconsistent with Arts. 55(1) and
127 See as examples the Judgments of 12 December 2012, ref. No. K 1/12 and of 19 December
2012, ref. No. K 9/12.
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(2) of the Constitution, as the possibility of extraditing a Polish citizen did not result
from the content of an international agreement, which only referred to the system of
law and left the determination of the admissibility of extradition of a Polish citizen
to the administrative discretion of an ofﬁcial, without any clear guidelines for such
discretion. Moreover, it lacked sufﬁcient speciﬁcity and was imprecise, and thus
failed to comply with the principle of a state ruled by law, expressed in Art. 2 of the
Constitution. The Tribunal stated that Art. 4(1) of the Extradition Treaty is an
example of an optional clause which provides for the possibility to refrain from
extraditing a country’s own nationals. However, this provision should be inter-
preted taking into account Art. 1 of the Extradition Treaty, which gives rise to the
obligation to extradite all persons sought for prosecution or found guilty of an
extraditable offence, regardless of their nationality. Despite the complainant’s
claims, the Extradition Treaty implies a possibility to extradite a Polish citizen, and
thus the requirement set out in Arts. 55(1) and (2) of the Constitution is met, namely
that the extradition of a Polish citizen may be granted ‘if such a possibility stems
from an international treaty ratiﬁed by Poland’. In other words, the extradition of a
Polish citizen is admissible not only when a ratiﬁed international agreement
introduces such an obligation, but also when only such a possibility arises
therefrom.
On 24 July 2014 the ECtHR issued judgments in the cases Husayn (Abu
Zubaydah) v. Poland and Al Nashiri v. Poland, concerning allegations of torture,
ill-treatment and secret detention of a Saudi Arabian national and a stateless
Palestinian, both suspected of terrorist acts.128 The applicants alleged that they were
held at a CIA ‘black site’ in Poland. In both cases, the Court found that Poland had
failed to comply with its obligation to furnish all necessary facilities for the effective
conduct of an investigation under Art. 38 of the ECHR. According to the ECtHR,
Poland had violated the applicants’ rights by enabling the United States to secretly
detain and torture the applicants on Polish territory, conducting an inadequate
investigation into the acts of torture and ill treatment committed in Poland and
allowing the applicants’ transfer to Guantánamo despite the real risk they would be
tortured and could be subjected to unfair trials and the death penalty by the United
States. The Court held that these failures constituted violations of the prohibition of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and
security, the right to respect for private and family life, the right to an effective
remedy and the right to a fair trial. As regards Mr. Al Nashiri, the Court further held
that there had been a violation of the right to life and abolition of the death penalty.
Poland referred the case to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, contesting the
judgment on procedural grounds. The appeal was rejected on 17 February 2015.
The Polish Constitution provides the same level of guarantees for the rights and
freedoms of foreigners as for those of Polish citizens. According to Art. 37(1) of the
Constitution all persons, being under the authority of the Polish State, shall enjoy
128 Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, 24 July 2014; Al Nashiri v. Poland,
no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014.
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the freedoms and rights ensured by the Constitution. A criminal investigation into
CIA secret prisons is still pending before the Polish Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce. Mr. Abu
Zubaydah and Mr. Al Nashiri have been granted the status of victim in the
investigation. According to information provided by the Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce, the
investigators are still collecting evidence and the investigation is taking longer than
expected since US ofﬁcials have not responded to requests for information. The
Polish Government has also asked the US for diplomatic assurances with regard to
Mr. Abu Zubaydah and Mr. Al Nashiri, who could face the death penalty in the US.
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